Aquinas at 800, Part 6: The Sensory and Beyond

Episode Topic: The Sensory and Beyond (https://go.nd.edu/754c19)

What do we and how can we know beyond what we can sense in the physical world? Contemplate Aquinas’ thoughts on why the philosophical limit of our sensations is cause for optimism, whether slothfulness might actually be a virtue, and how suffering is foundational to the development of our moral lives.

Featured Speakers:

• Janet Effron, Director of Online Learning, McGrath Institute for Church Life, University of Notre Dame
• Roberto Zambiasi, Postdoctoral Researcher, De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven
• Derek McAllister, Instructor of Philosophy, Loyola University Maryland and Towson University
• Melanie Susan Barrett, Professor of Moral Theology, University of St Mary of the Lake / Mundelein Seminary

Read this episode's recap over on the University of Notre Dame's open online learning community platform, ThinkND: https://go.nd.edu/e6b445.

This podcast is a part of the ThinkND Series titled Aquinas at 800. (https://go.nd.edu/67b7c4)

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Transcript

Introduction to the Session and Speaker

1 0:09

Pleasure and privilege today to be able to introduce you to the speakers for this afternoon session, psychology and Anthropology, the Sensory and beyond. Our first speaker will be joining us by Zoom. so I'll introduce him and then, we'll be able to have him join us via the screen behind me. Roberta Zai is a postdoctoral research at the D Wolf Mansion Center for ancient, medieval and res Renaissance philosophy at the Catholic University at live in Belgium. Within the research project studying medieval Hi Amorphism whole Hi Amorphic theory in intellectual context, 1250 to 1400. His research focuses on 13th and 14th Scholastic Aristotelian natural philosophy with a particular attention to the transformation of key concepts of Aristotelian Hylomorphism in the period, notably those of substantial form and substantial change, and to later medieval conceptions of the ontology of sensible qualities and of the nature of sensation. So please join me in welcoming Roberto Zabi and his talk, Aquinas on the limits of sensation, a radical epistemological optimism.

Aquinas' Interpretation and Radical Epistemological Optimism

2 1:29

good afternoon. everyone, I hope you can hear me well. thank you very much, for the introduction. thank you. To the organizers for giving me the opportunity to present my paper, and I want to apologize with you all for not being able to attend in person. Unfortunately, I have been dealing with some persistent health issues that ma have made it impossible for me to travel now. it is a crucial principle of risto and epistemology that all human natural recognition starts from sensation. This principle is as is well known, thoroughly embraced by Thomas Aquinas and frequently quoted by him in various contexts, not necessarily pertaining to his Aristotelian commentaries. One particularly remarkable instance is represented by Summa Prima pars SIO 12, article 12, an article devoted to the issue of the impossibility to recognize God through network recognition in this life. There in the response that you have here as text T one in the handout. Aquino states that our natural recognition begins from sense. Hence, our natural recognition can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. The use of the verb manure is particularly significant here since it underlines the essential dependence of human natural recognition on sensation. However, in the Risin Theory of Sensation as embraced by Aquinas sensation is a largely passive process where the sensible qualities endearing in material substances act on the corresponding external senses so as to produce sensations in them in this theory. Therefore, sensible qualities themselves, rather than the senses, represent the starting point of sensation and hands of natural recognition. But is it the case that according to the Risin Theory of sensation adopted by Aquin. All sensible qualities that exist or there could exist act on the senses. That is to say, according to such theory of sensation, are there, or could there be sensible qualities that cannot be sensed? My purpose in this paper is exactly to explore Aquinas position on this question. That is to say to examine his position on the issue of the limits of sensation. Interestingly, in contrast with most other aspects of his theory of sensation, this is an aspect that is still virtually unstudied, regardless of the fact that it is however of the utmost importance. Indeed admitting that there are, or at least there could be sensible qualities that cannot be sensed, would commit Aquinas to the belief that there are parts of the extramental material world, the bodies to which such qualities belong or would belong, that escape sensation. But then according to the principle, that whole human network recognition starts from sensation. If this were the case, then it would mean that for Aquinas there is, or there could be a part of the extramental material world that escapes our cognition. A total zone position on the issue might seem at first glance rather clear cut. Indeed, there are in the risin corpus important statements suggesting that for Aristotle, the entirety of the extramental material world can be recognized by the senses and through them, by the intellect. Consider, for instance, the animal book three, chapter eight, that, is text T two in the handout where Aristotle states in rather explicit terms, that in a sense that is through cognition, the soul is all the existing universe. Claims such as this one, would seem to commit Aris totalle to a radical epistemological optimism. But there is at least a passage that is the same with Sato chapter six, four hundred and forty five B 3 446 A 20 where Aristotle puts this belief to test here. My purpose is not that of providing a new reading of Aristo stone position in the passage. Rather, by examining Aquinas interpretation of this passage, I prepared to show that whether or not the attribution of a radical epistemological optimism according to which the entirety of the experimental material inward is recognizable by the senses and through them by the intellect, can be attributed to his total. It can certainly be attributed to Aquinas. I will proceed as follows. First, I will present Risottos discussion in the census six four hundred and forty five B 3, 446 a 20 in broad outline, and Alexander of Aphrodisia interpretation of it. Then I will focus on Aquinas interpretation of the past such in the conclusion I will highlight the wider epistemological implications of Aquinas discussion. Now the sensor at Sato is the first treaties of the parva, a series of works that following the anima are explicitly meant to address the psychophysiological aspects of the operations that the soul performs in conjunction with the body, for instance, sensation dreaming, growth, et cetera, that the sensor is of course, the treaties devoted to sensation. Nevertheless, the treatise focuses extensively not only on sensation itself, but also on sensible qualities under nature and under conditions of existence. This is not surprising, given that a said sensation according to its total is only possible because of the action of sensible qualities on the sensory powers. The last two chapters of the descents were devoted to the consideration of three porres arising from the previous discussion, the first one of them corresponding to the passage. I'm interested in concerns the issue of whether sensible qualities are potentially infinitely divisible. Now this issue originates from Aristotle's continuity understanding of the material world. Sensible qualities according to Aristotle cannot exist as free standing entities in the world. Rather sensible qualities are forms in earing, in material substances. There is no red in the Aristotelian worldview, only red objects. Now, since the matter of material substances is continuous and he potentially infinitely divisible, the question arises of whether sensible qualities insofar as they exist in matter, are potentially infinitely divisible through the division of matter as a result of notes. Both answers appear problematic. On the one hand, if sensible qualities were potentially infinitely divisible, then assuming that sensible qualities are defined by the ability to produce sensations, we should be able to sense even infinitely small portions of matter, but that would require for our sensory powers the ability to be increased infinitely. Something that runs counter to a fundamental principle of Aristotelian natural philosophy, according to which all natural powers are finite. On the other hand, if sensible qualities were not potentially infinitely divisible, then portions of matter too small to be sensed could exist on their own. And these portions of matter would turn out to be the components of the substances that we sense since they're obtained by dividing such substances. Even worse, such insensible, so to speak, portions of matter could not recognized by human beings insofar as by definition they could not be recognized by the senses. And at the same time they could certainly not recognized by our only other cognitive faculty, namely the intellect which only recognizes the experimental material word through the senses. This then would imply that such insensible portions of matter could not be recognized at all running precisely against the radical epistemological optimism of the anima. Three eight. Aris solution to the por is based on a distinction between the notion of potentially perceptible, of which are, is total distinguishes three meanings and that of actually perceptible include summary. And here, I move to text three T three in the handout. Aristotle claims that when we sense the sensible qualities of a substance, we sense the sensible qualities of the whole substance, not those of any of its parts. This seems phenomenological intuitive take to use one of the examples presented by Aristotle in the chapter, the case of a male seed. Now, when we sense the color of a les seed, we sense such color as a whole. Nevertheless, whenever we sense the color of a, of the les seed as a whole, we're also sensing the color of all of its quantitative parts, including to keep following Aristo example, the color of the 10000th part of the seed. However, the color of each of these parts is only potentially perceptible since it is not sensed by itself, but only insofar as the whole to which it belongs is sensed. This is exactly the first meaning of potentially perceptible that is distinguished very certain in the chapter. Now, of course, if we wanted, we could focus, so to speak our site on the color of a part of the seed, but only on that of sufficiently large parts. Now imagine to divide the moles seed by physically separating its parts, one from the other. Would the color of these parts, such as their other sensible qualities be perceptible when such parts exist on their own? Arisal idea is that the parts of the molested of a sufficient dimension, presumably those on which we could have focused our site when they exist in the whole seed become actually perceptible upon separation from the whole. That is when we divide the molested in halves, the color of each of the hubs of the les seed becomes perceptible. In actuality, in this sense, we could have said that such a color was potentially perceptible before the physical separation. That is when the two hubs existed together in the les seed. This is the second meaning of potentially perceptible distinguished barriers in the chapter. But what of smaller parts of the mill seed, and especially of parts too small to be perceptible on the road, such as the 10000th parts of the seed risottos claim, and here he moved to T four in the handout is that extremely small parts of a sensible substance are corrupted by the containing medium when they're separated from the hole to which they belong. Aristotle quotes as an example that of a drop of a flavored drink, for instance, wine poured into the sea. Although Aristotle does not say it explicitly, the underlying model that grounds his solution to the por seems to be the one according to each. All the parts of a sensible hole that are not perceptible by themselves, which supposedly correspond to the parts in which we could not have focused our senses when they existed in the whole substance, are immediately corrupted by the containing medium upon separation from the hole, thus losing their sensible qualities and acquiring those of the medium instead. According to this model. Therefore, the threshold of perceptibility of sensible qualities is lower than or at the limit, the same as the threshold of corruptibility, so to speak. This ensures that whatever part of a sensible substance will come to exist on its own by being separated from the whole to which it belongs, will be able to be sensed and thus recognized. Up to this point, there seems to be nothing in the text of the census six that contradicts the radical epistemological of optimism of the Anima Book three, chapter eight. The situation changes, however, in the part of the text that immediately follows the presentation of Aristo solution. And here we move to D five in the handout. Indeed. In a final twist to his discussion, Aristotle, in a particularly obscure past as appears to consider what would happen to the Extremly small parts of a sensible substance that is dosed too small to be sensed on their own, if as a mere conceptual possibility. One, imagine that they could remain in existence after having been separated from the whole without being corrupted by the containing medium. In this case, Aristotle claims they, they would still remain sensible. That is, they would retain their sensible qualities. Such sensible qualities could not be sens in actuality, but they would be potentially perceptible in a third sense of the expression, insofar as they would still possess the power to act on the senses and could do so when a sense power comes to them. It's exactly under the interpretation of Dylan's last statement. That the possibility of making Aristotle position in the sense six, compatible with the radical epistemological optimism of the animal Book three chapter eight hinges upon what does it mean that the sensible quality nearing in a Porsche of matter too small to be sensed on its own will become perceptible in actuality when a sense power comes to it? Aristotle does not provide any detail in this respect, but Alexander Ofia does in his deens of commentary, a text that after having been translated in late in by William of Mur, presumably already in 1260, will exert a crucial influence on later late the sensor commentators starting with Aquinas now, I move to T six in the handout. While explaining these passage, Alexander claims that what Aristotle means is that the portions of a sensible hole too small to be sensed if they could remain in existence on their own without being wrapped by the containing medium, could become perceptible anew by uniting with the sufficient quantity of other portions of matter, supposedly endowed with the same sensible qualities. This is to say that by forming by aggregation a hole that is sufficiently large to be sensed on its own parts of a sensible substance, too small to be sensed on their own, would become perceptible and new by contributing to the perceptibility and actuality of this hole. Of course, as Alexandra is keen on remarking the passage, the parts composing this aggregate would not be perceptible in actuality on their own. Rather, they would be potentially perceptible in the first sense, distinguished by his total. That is by contributing to the actual perceptibility of the aggregate as a whole, in a way, aching to that in which they contributed to the actual perceptibility of the substance to which they belonged before being separated from it. Alexander's interpretation makes it clear in what sense? Even the sensible qualities of portions of a sensible substance, too small to be sensed existing on drone could produce a sensation in the senses That is by forming together a sufficiently large aggregate. However, Alexander's conceptual model is not compatible with the strict reading of the Anima book three sub trade according to Alexander's model. In these, sorry. Indeed, it is conceptually possible that parts of a sensible substance too small to be sensed, such as the 10000th part of the Malay seed, can remain in existence on their own with their sensible qualities in a condition in which they cannot be detected by the senses to put it. In other words, certainly according to Alexander's model, the 10000th part of the male acid is not entirely out of the reach of the senses, since it could become perceptible by forming a sufficiently large aggregate with other parts of matter endowed with same sensible qualities, but the 10000th part of the molested could also remain in existence without ever forming such a sufficient to large aggregate. For instance, such a part of a molested could fall on the ground and remain there entirely imperceptible. It is exactly against such a possibility that Aquinas as a will now show reacts. In a famous article published in the Mal Manne August Manon showed the extensive use that had been made by Aquinas of the newly translated the Sense commentary by Aand Rhodesia in his own the Sense SU commentary, which can be dated to 1268 to 1269. This makes it even more significant that when faced with the crucial passage of the census 6 446 a 10 15, Aquinas chooses not to follow Alexander's in Aquinas discussion In particular, there is no trace of the idea that portions of a sensible hole too small to be sensed on the own, could become perceptible and new by united with the sufficient quantity of matter and dialed with the same sensible qualities. The reason is clear enough. Aquinas thoroughly embraces the radical epistemological optimism of the animal Book three, chapter eight, so that he cannot accept that even if extremely small portions of material substance were not corrupted by the containing medium, they could retain their sensible qualities while being undetectable by the senses. It is precisely for this reason that the entire issue of how imperceptible portions of a sensible hole could become perceptible and you does not even arise for Aquinas. But how then can Aquinas explain the passage of the sensor six, where it certainly introduces the idea that in the absence of the correct, in action of the containing medium portions of a sensible hole, too small to be sensed on their own could retain their sensible qualities? The crucial move made by Aquinas and I turned to the seven in the handout. To read this passage not as a new section of the text, rather at the, as a passage that is parallel to the one that immediately precedes it, namely the census 6 446 A seven 10, where Aristotle introduces the idea that portions of a substance too small to be sentenced would be corrupted by the containing medium upon separation from the whole to which they belong. According to Aquinas, the two passages present to complimentary arguments to show that not even parts of a sensible hole separated off are sensible. Continuing the division to Infinity Aquinas formulation is not entirely peruse, but I believe that the best way to make sense of it is to think that Aquinas reads the two passages as representing two arguments to prove that it's not sorry to prove that it's not possible to keep dividing a sensible hole through physical separation in ever smaller parts. There must be a threshold of smallness below which parts of a sensible hole cannot remain in existence on the row, separated from the hole to which they belong. Such threshold moreover, must be higher than or at least equal to the threshold of Perceptibility. According to Aquinas. The difference between the two argument is that the first one is an argument from the point of view of the parts themselves, whereas the second is from the point of view of the sense power itself. Once the structure of Aristos discussion is understood in this way, the overall interpretation of the text by Aquinas becomes something like the following in the sense six for hundred 46, a seven 10 Aristotle showing that portions of a sensible hole, too small to be sense, would be corrupted upon separation from the hole to which they belong. But so Aristotle would argue 446, say 10 15. Even if one considered what would happen in the absence of the cause of their corruption, still it would not be possible to admit that portions of a sensible hole, too small to be sensed on their own could exist separated from the hole to which they belong. These, according to how Aquinas reads Aristo argument would imply admitting exactly the infinite increase in sensory powers that Aristotle deemed impossible at the beginning of the sensor six. This is what Aquinas claims, syntax D eight. But if this reading is right, then it means that Aquinas believes that the impossibility of the existence of sensible qualities, engineering in portions of substances too small to be detected by the census is not merely a natural impossibility as it was in Alexander's reading of the census. Six. Rather, it is a conceptual impossibility. It's exactly because the sensible quality is defined by its ability to produce sensations, and as such, must possess by essence the active power to alter the corresponding sense that the passive sensory power capable to be affected by. It must always be posited unless one wanted to admit the possibility of the existence of an active power in the absence of its corresponding passive power, which would be absurd in Aquinas reading. Therefore the limiting the increase of sensory powers determines the limit to the conceptual possibility of dividing sensible qualities. And this is exactly what Aquinas claims at the end of this discussion, which is the text that I put in the handle test as T nine. So to conclude, on the basis of this presentation, what would be tempted to say that when compared with Aquinas Aristotles epistemological optimism as expressed in the animal book three, chapter eight is not nearly as radical. It is only on a reading such as Aquinas that the idea that no part of the extramental material world that can escape being detected by the census takes its most extreme forward, more important still, the reason that grounds Aquinas trust in our possibility to know the entirety of the universe that surrounds us is not to be found in some sort of anthropological hubris. Rather it is grounded on, sorry. Rather, it is grounded on the belief that whatever is capable of autonomous existence in the universe is at the same time capable to affect our sensitive faculties. To put it in other words, recognizability for Aquinas becomes an essential property of any object that belongs to the instrumental material word. Thank you very much for your attention.

1 23:05

We have a few minutes for questions and I'll ask if you have a question, if you'd let me bring the microphone to you so our speaker can hear your question.

3 23:27

Okay, thank you. I'm not sure how to pose this question, but it sounds like. Aquinas is giving a very human-centric view of, of objects in the world that, anything he can't, I can't believe that something would be, say so small and still have its own integrity it, that we couldn't see it. Do you think it would be because he thinks God would not have created things as such because humans should be able to, perceive everything that can be perceived or like what would be the story there? Because it doesn't seem to, with me, to accord with reality. Obviously we know there are bacteria that are too small to be perceived or many other things that seem to have their own integrity, so I'm trying to make sense of that picture. Thanks.

2 24:15

thank you very much for the question. Yes, this is a very important point. Now, I think that of course Aquinas has, a theological reason for holding for this view in the sense that, of course the ability for us humans to recognize the, entirety of the experimental material award accord with our sort of privileged position in creation. but I think that here Aquinas is really trying, is really basing his, confidence in our ability to know the entirety of the experimental material award. I would say, on a simple, understanding on, on, on his understanding of the natural world, simply based on Aristotelian natural philosophy now, and especially his understanding of the role played by sensible qualities now, sensible qualities for Aristotle and. For Aquinas following him are essentially oriented towards producing sensations. So this is the final cause if one could say so, of their existence is their, ability to produce sensations in the senses. And this is what exactly what defines sensible qualities. So in a sense, the idea of, something existing with its own sensible qualities, but not being able to produce sensation would be, a useless power, a useless entity in the world. It would be, you know, something that is meant to produce sensation but would not be able to do so. And so it would point to an imperfection of the material universe in a sense. So, so I think that here Aquinas is simply confident that given the way sensible qualities. Given what sensible cos are, it is part of the perfection of the universe that they're always able, they must be always able to produce sensation in the senses. And of course, this is something that might appear rather counterintuitive based on our understanding of the world. We know that there are so many entries that escape detection by the senses due to your smallness. But then again, I think that Aquinas would say something like, maybe such entities escape detection by the census based on our own cognitive faculties, sorry, based on our own sensitive faculties. But then it is also true at the same time that part of what we do in current scientific practice is devising, instruments and tools that can help us proceed farther and farther in somehow, if not directly sensing, at least indirectly, discovering the extremely, you know, that the infinitely small, Be that through, you know, subatomic physics or any other, kind of, or in any other branch of scientific inquiry that is directly directed to the extremist mode. So I think at Aquinas would say that, you know, in a sense, although we're not possibly able to detect such extremly small entities with our unaided sensitive faculties, she would be extremely confident in our possibility to, in any case, become aware of such extremly small parts of the world through, you know, the instruments that we create through our own scientific and technological, progress in a sense to put it in contemporary terms. I hope that makes sense and thank you again for the question.

1 27:23

Are there any additional questions? I think we've got time for one more.

4 27:31

Hi, thank you for your talk. I'm more familiar with Albert on this, area than on Thomas. So Albert will, argue in several places for like the sufficiency of the division of the five senses. So he'll argue that in principle there could only be the five senses and their corresponding, corresponding sensible qualities. does Thomas engage in the same kind of argument there that in principle there could only be the five senses and their proper sensible qualities?

2 28:03

Yeah. thank you. Thank you for your question. yeah, in terms of the kind of sensible qualities, in terms of the species of sensible qualities that could exist, yes. if understood you correctly, Aquinas would certainly take the same route as Albert and he does, and he's the sensible commentary in various places. So he explicitly claims that there could not be other sensible qualities, apart from the ones that we can per, that can, we can send through our five external senses. and this, because, you know, each sense is defined by the quality that the, that it can perceive. So, I mean, she would probably say that if one had the reason to admit the possibility of a different, Species of sensible qualities. Then at the same time, one should admit a sense that could sense them or something like that. So, so that the correspondence must be maintained, but it is not an issue in which he specifically engages in argumentation means he, he mostly follows Aristotle here without adding, as far as I know, any original argument of his own for the discussion. So this would be something that you would simply take from the Risso worldview and yep. And accept.

5 29:11

Thank you.

1 29:19

I now have the pleasure of introducing our second speaker. Dr. Derek McAllister is currently on the faculty of philosophy at St. Mary's Seminary in university in Baltimore, Maryland, where he teaches just pre theology seminarians. He's also on the faculty of philosophy at Towson University. His academic work centers around depression from a philosophical perspective, in particular, examining the modern day con concept of depression in comparison with many other symptomatically similar historical conditions. For example, sloth, AIA in moderate, so sorrow, melancholy, ki guardian despair, the dark night of the soul, and so forth. His research draws upon themes in St. Thomas Aquinas, so in Ki Guard, St. John of the Cross, the Desert Fathers and Mother Teresa. This talk is titled Virtuous Lawfulness. Aia considered as a Good Passion.

Conclusion: Acadia and Moral Development

6 30:16

Alright, so thank you all for being here. I'm just gonna jump right in. I call it Acadia. Some people call it a cdia. Acadia is one of the seven deadly sins of capital vices, according to a. But curiously, Aquinas also names Acadia as one of the four species of sorrow. We know, of course, that passions or emotions are not sinful in themselves, but are good when governed by reasoned, and directed their proper object and are bad when they're not. Well. We can easily imagine virtuous, healthy, redeemable uses for the other species of sorrow like mercy, or anxiety, or angst, or even envy. It's not obvious what good can be found in listlessness or sloth. The very idea of a healthy or virtuous slothfulness seems like an oxymoron. So in this essay, I explore this idea of a moderate good Acadia considered as a passion, a natural passion of the human being, what it looks like, and what sorts of things it's best directed at. And it turns out, as I argue, that moderate Acadia is an essential component of the virtuous life in leaving behind the life of sin and enjoyment and debauchery, and seeking instead one's true enjoyment and proper good. So the first section, Acadia in itself. Acaia can, be understood in two ways. qua vice or qua passion on the one hand understood as a vice, it's numbered among the seven deadly sins and it's always bad. Understood correctly. Acadia qua vice is not simply laziness or slothfulness, but at its courts and aversion to the hard work that leads to one's true joy. And that can manifest not only in listlessness or laziness, but also manifest in restlessness or diversions. Acadia is consider considered a capital vice because it undermines, charity in the human heart, on the other hand, can be considered as a passion species of sorrows. We said like all passions is morally neutral in and of itself. this con paper concerns possibility of Acadia considered a normal human emotion used for good. So critically, it is not the case that these two Acadia qua Vice and Acadia qua passion never overlap. They sometimes do rather the vice actually springs from normal human emotion. The vice manifests when the emotion becomes sinful. And there's a handy corollary if we think about another deadly sin, wrath, anger per se, like all human emotions is morally neutral, but when it's uncovered and at its worst, it becomes wrath. It just so happens that the name anger changes to wrath. So that's really very helpful. The same thing happens with Acadia. The passion at it, its worst becomes the deadly sin Acadia, but no such name changes, you know, unfortunately it's not available to us. It's just called the same things, which leads to ambiguity. a couple of things before I turn to, the next section. First. The nature of Acadia as a species of sorrow. It's sorrow in this respect. It's a weighing down sadness that leads to a weariness with respect to acting. Thomas says in his own words, he says, Acadia is the sort of heavy sadness that presses down on a man's mind, in which, in such a way that no activity pleases him. of course you can see, easily see how this could become bad. second, as I mentioned with the Vice of Acadia, as with any case, with any sin, can manifest as either mortal or venial. that is, there's a difference in the degree of offense. So I'd venture to say that probably ra very rarely does Acadia ever manifest as I mortal sin For most of us, Aquinas describes Im mortal sin of Acadia as an act of dislike, horror, and detestation of things of God. rather I think that we find ourselves falling into it. But in its mortal, what had only been a disordered desire. In the same sentine appetite then rises to the level of the intellect where reason, consents, and it becomes an act of hatred of things have gone. Alright, so next section. The many objects of Acadia now, fundamentally and as a capital vice, the object of Acadia, its primary object is God. However. It's not all, that's only in its primary sense. Secondarily, since it springs from normal human emotion, it can also manifest secondarily in any human being who experiences emotions. And thus ha can have many other different objects. That is Acadia Qua Vice can be applied secondarily to things like any love, relationship or object of desire, which leads to joy. Things like one's romantic relationship, parenting, friendship, family vocation, or faith tradition. This is why Rebecca Conan dike Young refers to Acadia as, excuse me, what she calls resistance to the demands of love. She takes, an example of a married couple get into a fight at dinnertime, and they head to opposite corners of the house. The easy and unhealthy thing to do would be to do nothing, to ignore the conflict and hope it goes away to shrink from it or distract oneself by engaging in something else. The much more difficult and healthy thing to do is reconcile to do the hard work. Maybe you're noticing theme here, that's still work, right? The slothfulness is not the work, the emotional labor in this case. That's the work, the emotional work that's required to say, I'm sorry, learning to live together, love each other, and so on. The alternative, this hard work, of course, Acadia, the shrinking back from that. Take another example. with my son, I'm bound to certain demands of low. There are certain requirements not di dictated by him or by me because they were present when he was born before he could dictate anything to me. And I don't get to opt out of those requirements, right? If I opted not to give him time and attention and be rather a sign that I was failing my very real requirements. So those are real requirements and they are demands dictated by the nature of the love relationship itself. So suppose I were to shrink from these demands. There are some Saturdays I'd rather sleep in than take him to the farmer's market or to his soccer game an hour and a half away. He's in youth sports now, so that's fun. But love is willing to go to the other. And so the better thing to do would be for me to take him to the farmer's market, to a soccer game, get him outta the house where he is not in front of a screen all day, and being resistant to Acadia to that is Acadia in its secondary form where the object is the good of my son. A final example. Here's one I use with my students. Whatever their ultimate vocation or calling is. Their vocation right now is to be a student. on graduation day, they will experience joy. The good here, the object of Arcadia is the good of being educated and they are shrinking away from that'cause. It's all too familiar feeling to be a sailed by bouts of sluggishness, restlessness when facing difficulty associated with pursuing the good, namely all those tests and writing papers and homeworks and so on. Now, let me, so, so that is the familiar understanding of Acadia shrinking from work and it can apply to multiple different objects. Now, let's think of Acadia as a passion, but. And to clarify, those are not the capital Vice Acadia, but those are vicious kinds of Acadia that aren't because the object is not God. All right? Okay. So, but now let's look at Acadia as a good passion. When it's good, when it's properly ordered within a person. So starting off with sorrow, because you know that's a species of Acadia. A species of sorrow is Acadia. Sorrow can be bad, of course, but can also be good when it is moderate and properly directed. For example, grief over the loss of a loved one. So long as it's not incapacitating that is as moderate and it's properly directed at a bad thing that is maybe the a loved one's death. Sorrow is not only good and healthy, but also human and expected. In fact, it'd be inappropriate if one did not express sorrow in such a circumstance. If it is the case with sorrow, generally it is the same with Acadia, specifically a species of sorrow. Acadia is a good passion, can then be described succinctly as follows. Acadia is a passion, a good one is not an extreme hatred or even profound distaste, but rather it's a diminishing interest coupled initially with sorrow for reluctance after separation from the once loved object, the bad object, and when matured and reason governs, resolves into a lack of interest or care for the once loved bad object. Notice that when Acadia is a good, the object has to be a bad object. That one is shrinking and pulling away from now, very careful listener or reader may be able to intuit some hesitance or my saying, whether this involves a complete rejection or maybe a lingering sorrow. I think it's actually both. and this is because of an in its different. Stages of development. So to the degree to which one still feels a profound attraction towards the bad object, yet acts rightly, is the degree to which the person we can say is continent on the path to virtue, but not yet truly virtuous. Such a person will feel the lingering sorrow, the residual grieving over the loss of bad object. The truly virtuous person, by contrast, won't exhibit that grief as much, but rather it will manifest as a lack of interest or even sluggishness. why am I talking about grief? Because again, there's this sadness involved. This is, I don't wanna really, give this up. both of these facets, the sluggish withdrawal in the form of grieving over loss and the sluggish withdrawal, which matures into a veritable disinterest, are manifestations of the passion of Acadia. The only difference between them is how strongly the person still desires the bad object. Now, I'm gonna give you some concrete examples now. That was the abstract. if Acadia, given that it's a human, normal human emotion, we should expect to see it all over the place. So here are some examples. think of somebody who is an alcoholic, they've turned away from the bottle, or any substance addiction that you like. some men who are merely consonant to use aerosols term still strongly desire to drink perhaps just as much before. But yeah, they still choose the good, but the feeling which manifests is Acadia sorrow over or grieving for the loss of the once loved bad object. But our person, our former alcoholic, our virtuous person, has so progressive virtue that he no longer feels even the slightest desire for the drink. What was once a strong excessive desire has now abated to almost nothing, or rather, I should say, has been ordered rightly. when the object meets his intellect, he's completely disinterested in it and does not desire it. simple, moderate, good Acadia. It's important to know this would exclude any strong dislike or hatred for these once loved batch objects, remember it's not a crusade against or a hatred of these things. The recovering alcoholic does not seek to fire bomb a liquor store or something. It's just that I no longer desire in that and pulls away and manifests more moderately as diminishing interest in these things. Here's another example. a growing disco concern for petulant, partying, cavorting, and so on is the decrease perhaps in being solely energized by pursuit of aeros as when once, one was, once a young lover for there are many other and greater pleasures to attain not only a relationship with another, but also generally speaking in the world, or it's the growing weary of old tire hemi jokes, not because they're simply unfunny, but because one has matured beyond their appeal. For example, I'm newly married. I've discovered very early on that my wife does not have much patience for your mom jokes. She's living mes like one per day, and, I still go over my allotment. but that is, they become tiresome right to the listener. in short, it's just a feeling that unvirtuous things are simply tiresome. Now, each one of these examples have in common a bad object withdrawal from which may produce sorrow or grief, which ultimately for one's good. Here's another example. Leaving behind a toxic relationship. Certainly a bad, but something also understandably to be mourned, right? Because you still want to be in a relationship, but you're pulling away from it, which is good for you, but you're mourning it as you do so. Or here's an everyday example. Changing your university. sorry, changing your, could be that, but change your major at university. Suppose you feel compelled in your true vocation to pursue dance instead of pre-med. I just wanna dance, right? Well, that's where your heart truly lies and you know that you, because that's your calling, that you can only be happy there. But there's going to be a certain real true grieving process that comes with that switch. You can no longer make bank from being a doctor. You may support, or sorry, disappoint your fam family, your parents. There's this sorrowful grieving that must take place as you shrink away from and withdraw from that form of major. Now. Here's an important thing that you might have picked up on. Withdrawing from the bad thing object that you're withdrawing from is not necessarily inherently bad, it's just not the right thing for you at that moment, right? So, this highlights a key component. I'll explain here. Need not be the object, need not be inherently bad. yeah, I'll skip over that. Alright. I also wanna think about some literary examples, at least one I've got more in the paper that could send you if you'd like. Here's one vivid literary example of virtuous Acadia, along with this varying levels of formative development in tolkiens loaded rings. So consider the vast differences in the way the ring has power over each of Golum, Gandalf and Bilbo. I hope that you've at least seen the movie. You probably should have at least, you know, read the book, but at least maybe you've seen the movie. and you can think of these differences between these characters, even if, you don't assume there's any magical power in the ring, if you just consider it like a function of the owner's desire for the object. That's just what we're really focusing on. So considering only desires and actions of these three agents, we could see that Golum, of course, represents the vicious man. Gandalf, the virtuous man. Bilbo, we'll call him the continent, man. Excuse me. Golum is disastrously, sickly, addicted to the ring. He must be united with my precious. And clearly this obsession has taken a psychological and even physical toll on him. Golum represents while the vicious person, his overwhelming desire for the evil object masks over and pushes out any nascent opposing desires that might otherwise be present. He does not desire the good, he desires the bad, and of course, he acts on the bad. That's what makes him vicious. He that is, he never gives up the ring willingly. He always chooses what is evil. Gandalf is on the other extreme. He is our virtuous man. He leaves his ring behind in a show of virtuously, overcoming his dark impulse. Fully aware of the evil poten potential of the ring. Gandalf rises above any temptation to possess him. While in truth, there may be some dark latent desire within Gandalf to possess the evil ring, I could allow for that. You know, we aren't all perfect. again, we are assuming here that there's no magical power within the ring itself. There's only viewing it for the agent's desires. That such dark desire never really manifests itself to a point the Gandalf acts easily, readily, or predictably on it. In other words, if such a desire, dark desire were to exist, it would not even be worth mentioning for. It plays no part in his decided actions for the good. Bilbo is somewhere in between. That's photos uncles. All right. Okay. I just wanna make sure I'm canonical here. Okay, good. he's somewhere between eventually giving the ring up, but Sorrowfully reluctantly. There are times when Bill desires it. There are times when he recognizes his desire for the ring is bad and so desires not to possess it. he has strong conflicting desires and he represents the continent man. He both desires the good and desires the bad. It ultimately chooses the good. Now, I've described their characters, but now let's look at it through the view of a good Acadia, because I think each one of these are expressing, and manifesting this passion not just of bad, but good Acadia. So let's take Gollum first. I think healthy, good Acadia quo passion is present even in Gollum, albeit not very strongly. Of course, even in Gollum, our vicious man separation from the ring, would it be akin to the greatest loss? The most sorrowful grief reason and context indicate that even Gollum in his soberist moments understood that my precious was not actually a true good, but was an object of twisted delight, and that's key. So he knew. Although he much desired it, that it ultimately was a twisted desire, that it was bad, but he still wanted it. It was a painful withdrawal from an object construed as bad. now Golum then is at the barest beginnings of a healthy Acadia, a withdrawal from a bad, but only in a sobers moments. And we see kind of bare glimpses of this throughout Bilbo. our continent man exhibits a painful, aching longing for the ring. Even though he realizes his true badness, he both desires the good desires, the bad, yet chooses the good. He eventually reluctantly and through sorrowful loss and longing bestows the ring upon Frodo Bilbo's Acadia then is more matured, but not quite complete. We can see clearly the sorrowful grief dimension present in healthy Acadia. When we look at bilbo and when an evil object is delighted over it, is diff difficult to relinquish it even when one knows that the object is evil. Gandalf, of course, a virtuous man recognizes the true badness of the ring. But I still think we could probably see Acadia here, but we see it in its most mature, manifestation. We see it as an, a real unaffected disinterest. He has throughout becoming virtuous. he is not utterly, completely unaffected by its intoxicating spell. I mean, just look at Soran. It's a great wizard. but Gandalf rightly chooses to disregard the ring sensation, intentionally turn his attention to other more righteous things. And this, although Gandalf's passion of Acadia for the ring might not be perfected, it is as close perhaps as anyone's in the Lord of the Rings he presents with a sober and informed awareness of its badness while maintaining a true utter disregard for its false allure. All right, in the conclusion. I've given several examples in shown how Acadia qua passion can be moderate and governed by reason. When it's directed at an object that is bad, and how not only can this make Acadia the passion good. I think it represents a very vivid and key insight into what goes on in moral development, shrinking back from the bad, which may at first elicit sorrow or grief, but after a time manifest in sober and matured disinterest. In addition, this account, and presenting the very levels of healthy good ACA that is at continent and virtuous demonstrates truly and accurate, the enduring and continued pursuit of the good life, how it's difficult for one who first engages in character development and pursuit of the good, but after a while, how it resolves understandably into equilibrium, disinterest for bad, for those who become truly virtuous. Thank you.

1 49:16

Now if there are any questions.

7 49:19

Hi. So thank you for your paper. I'm really interested in Acadia and, but I'm interested in your classification of it as a passion. And so I'm trying to understand how all these things come together in one thing that you're gonna call Acadia. So, because you're simultaneously talking about the withdrawal, so this sounds like an action. And then you're talking about sorrowful grief, which sounds like a feeling and emotion, but then undergirding all of this is desire. So it sounds like there are three moments here that are involved in every instance of Acadia. Is that right? And if so, I'm just wondering why do we wanna think of this then as a passion rather than an action? and I just wanna know a little bit more about how you bring these moments together into a single thing that we're gonna call.

6 50:07

Yeah. So, one key thing. So you mentioned it might sound like it's action, it's activity or movement. There's movement in the passions. with Aquinas there's like different, there's like a moving toward things, the object moving away from there. there's resolution, right? So like, you know, you can, have a desire for something and then you can love a thing, and then that results, if you obtain the object, then it resolves into joy. And then similar movement away from things. You know, if you're not able to, if you find yourself united with a thing that you don't want, it's sorrow, you know, resolves there. so that's why I kind of, in some of these sections, you may hear me talking about joy, like, one's vocation, you know, you pursue that because, well, graduation day will be joy, you know, you don't think of it as being that right now because there's all this stuff in between. But that's ultimately what Acadia. Is it's, there's the object and I'm pulling away from the work that it takes to get to that, the joy and that and why would that be classified as a species of sorrow? Well, because sorrow's opposite joy, right? It's the movement away from joy. So, that's just like an understanding of the movements of the passions, resolving and so on. Does that help at all with

8 51:20

it's strange to figure out exactly. You know, is this just a feeling?

6 51:25

It is, and certainly like any, it can be coupled with action, certainly. But, in the same way yearning or desire is kind of like a, it's not really an action, but it's like a pointed towards something. This would be a withdrawing in that sense. Yeah.

8 51:42

Good. Thank you.

9 51:42

Yeah. thank you Derek, for the great talk. I had a similar question. But I make sure I understand you correctly. So, using the example of Gandalf as kind of the, case study of perfect use of A KDF as a passion, right? You said that he would be completely disinterested in the ring.

6 52:03

yeah. for recognizing the object as bad, a disinterest in it, wanting to possess the bad object. Wanting the object's badness, right? Go ahead. Sorry.

9 52:16

Yeah, so my question is it the most perfective form of Acadia as a passion? is disinterest then how's it a, why would we classify it as a passion? I feel like there'd be something positive. Impassion, right? Like there's anger. QAs talks about it. it's this hatred towards a, was it erasable evil? I forget. It's associated with this bodily movement too. But indifference, I feel, would I have the, if I'm indifferent about a lot of things, do I have the passion of Acadia towards various things that I'm not even

6 52:46

I see. No, because you have, there's an intellectual component as well that you have to have, an understanding of the object. You have to have the object in mind. So this is why, in the case of a drinker or a smoker, you know, you always hear about people who, they overcome addiction and then they can, you know, smell cigarette smoke and it's just, it just doesn't bother them or something, you know? And like, that's the picture of someone who is just complete disinterested because they have the object in mind and it doesn't have its pool anymore. And so, did that help answer that question, Patrick? Yeah. So he, so. I guess simply'cause disinterest is a form of passion. It's not a absence of feeling necessarily, but it's, I think it resolves that when it's eventual, but it, yeah, it's, yeah. I dunno. I'd have to think more about that because maybe, you know my example, like, you don't fire bomb a liquor store. In his instance of Acadia as a capital vice, the most extreme would be an act of hatred towards God. So there could be that parallel. So maybe that is circadia. However, at the same time, when you move one passion, it's hard to talk about passions in isolation because other parts of the soul are gonna move too. And other passions are gonna be operative. So is that. Actually Acadia operating the act of hatred of things of God? Or is that a result of, you know, just, I just don't wanna hear about any of that. Don't talk to me. And so maybe that's another part of the soul that like, oh, I don't wanna hear about politics. I just utterly hate disgusted by it. But you talk about it, oh, that flares up, you know, it triggers me or something. You know, that may just be a different part, a different passion's operative there. So I'm not sure. Yeah, I think about that. Yeah. yeah.

5 54:39

Yeah. I suppose, yeah. So must of virtuous, Kaia also did, accompanied by love of the good alternative because it seems to me like just staying in that indifference.

6 54:53

Absolutely. Absolutely. Yeah. And I give an example of, so this is not as apparent as. With gal.'cause I haven't identified like what his good object would be. But I have given another literary example with the symposium, Plato. so Socrates and Es comes in and he is like, Hey, let's go to bad Socrates. And he's talking about a different kind of love and Socrates's, frankly, just completely not interested in any of that.'cause he, well, his object, he's disinterested in that he's more interested in the object of love, like or virtue. So that's where his things go. Yeah. So it would necessarily be coupled by that Yelp.

10 55:31

So building off of that, would you then be willing to say that you could almost classify this virtuous circadia as like a stable disposition to react in the appropriate way towards deficient goods after you become appropriately attached to the inferior goods? Like for the alcoholic, he sees the inferior good of. Stability or something like that, so that when he comes into contact with this deficient good of the drink, he's unmoved by it. Yep. Is that an appropriate way of stating what?

6 56:07

Yeah, I think that, so remember Acadia, if you're trying to isolate it just as the passion, it's not gonna be a disposition necessarily, but it's the feeling that you're feeling as you're drawing away from that once loved object that you were once attracted to. You're drawing away from the bad. and it puts you in a disposition, I'd say to in, in habits sort of just to be like, eh, I'm just not my thing anymore. But if you were to reflect on, well, how do I feel about smoking? Like, you're gonna be like, well, really, I mean, don't care much about it when I smell it. You know? So that would be the feeling we're trying to isolate. Yeah. Okay. We had two more questions maybe, but go ahead.

11 56:45

just kind of following up on that one. So is it the case then that virtuous ACU is always gonna have a history, right? It's, it will never be the first, feeling you have about an object or a

6 56:58

That's really interesting. Probably. Yeah, I think so because it involves, because it's a species of sadness. you're, and it's a movement away from an object. Yeah. It seems like it have that historical component necessarily. Yeah. It's gonna be What object did you once love?

12 57:13

Maybe do one more very quick question, but it'll have to Did you have

6 57:15

one more quick question, Becky? Yeah.

12 57:17

I was just thinking about, I'm gonna be working too hard of trying to keep the parallel between virtuous and vicious Acadia here. But

5 57:23

yeah,

12 57:23

in with continents, I can see how there's the lingering sorrow and that can match up with, you know, lingering sorrow for something that you shouldn't want. It's a vicious type. But when we get to a fully virtuous laugh of interest, I have trouble. there's a dis long parallel with say, hatred of God, right? We're not supposed to have, but you're saying that hatred of alcohol is having an aggressive people with alcohol, so they would not be there. I'm wondering if the Acadia kind of goes away. I mean, it doesn't a bad thing, but maybe the acaia kind of goes away, burn you. You, well,

6 57:54

that's a possibility. You know,

12 57:56

there can be topics that like aren't worthwhile, so you guys just gonna glaze over and you're just like totally decent. Yeah.

6 58:02

It's worth pointing out that the etymology of Acadia just means without care. That could be the actual resolution of the passion itself. Like you get to a point where you drawing, you're drawing your, that sorrow, that's the sadness, you know, eliciting itself, manifesting. But then you get to a point where it's just like, I don't, you know, it's just lack of care is what it really just really means. Yeah.

1 58:22

Thank, well, thank you again, Derek. And it is now my pleasure to introduce Melanie Barrett, who serves as professor and chair of the Department of Moral Theology at the University of St. Mary of the Lake Mundle Seminary. She holds both a PhD in religious ethics from the University of Chicago Divinity School and an STD in Moral Theology from the University of Borg in Switzerland. She has published one book on the ethics of theologian, Hans Alazar, numerous articles and book chapters on various topics, and is currently finishing a second book on Suffering's relationship to virtue in Aquinas theology. Her presentation today is entitled, suffering and the Moral Life, A Optimistic Perspective.

59:08

Thank you. can everyone hear me with this microphone please? Great. The medieval theologian, Thomas Aquinas uses various terms to delineate the human experience of suffering, such as passio, passivity being acted upon detrimental change. Paus to be capable of suffering, pat to undergo or endure in firmus, being sick or feeble, dip perio to be impaired or diminished. Meia, misery, distress, anxiety, a flexio, pain or torment, dolia to feel pain, dolo or pain. Porus, delo, bodily pain, anime, passio, the suffering of the soul and traia, sorrow or grief, which we heard a lot about. Taken together, suffering denotes not only the various evils, the deprivations of good, which we encounter regularly in our fallen creaturely existence, but also. Suffering denotes the painful way in which we subjectively experience these evils. Consequently, suffering evil is itself an evil, and yet for Aquinas suffering evil not only can be spiritually fitting, but also can provide the occasion for good. This results from God's providential design in which the punishment for sin, including original sin, can be medicinal oriented toward the improvement of the individual or the community viewed from this providential medicinal vantage point. It is reasonable to analyze the moral meaning of suffering. How an experience of suffering can contribute positively to personal moral growth, either one's own or that of others. By moral growth, I mean improvement in one's ability to correctly discern the good and or act in accord with the good. In concrete situations, I readily acknowledge that suffering can impede growth in virtue by imposing difficult, physical, mental, or emotional obstacles such as pain, fear, anger, or despair. However, I also contend that suffering can by can provide the occasion for growth in virtue either the acquisition of natural virtue or the deepening of infused virtue. In this essay, I will illustrate how suffering can interface constructively with virtue by analyzing one virtue in particular, the virtue of justice with a specific focus on the will's relationship to material possessions. Methodologically, I aim not to. Propose a new interpretation of Aquinas, but to illuminate the path of Christian discipleship in which suffering is not merely endured, but becomes an occasion for greater configuration to the interior freedom and charity of Christ. In the longer article version that I submitted for this conference, I first illuminate the utility of suffering as one transitions from the vice of covetousness to the virtue of liberality, which is connected to the virtue of justice. In my presentation today, I will skip ahead to part two of my argument on infused justice within the life of Christian discipleship by analyzing the practice of voluntary poverty for the sake of God's kingdom, focusing specifically on its sacrificial dimension. Aside from God's initial act of justification, which accompanies baptism and which serves to remove the stain of sin and gift, the believer with the share and divine life through the work of the Holy Spirit, the virtue of infused justice serves to deepen a person's reliance on God by removing the distractions of earthly comforts. A goal accomplished through the practice of voluntary poverty, foregoing material possessions which are good in themselves, thus can be salutary, not only to root out any inordinate attachments to them as one transitions from covetousness to liberality, but also as a means to draw one so close to God. That one eventually comes to disdain the world entirely by comparison, voluntarily voluntary poverty, thus functions as a means to perfection in religious life. In several of his writings, Aquinas vigorously defends the practice of voluntary poverty against those who seek to delegitimize it as unnecessary, impractical, and potentially even harmful. For example, in Contra Doc, ENS a Relie, he asserts that the central teaching of Christianity taught by Jesus in both word and manner of life is to divert humanity's attention away from material things and focus instead on spiritual things. Although, quote, Satan and his jealousy of our salvation has never since the earliest stages ceased from hindering men in the holy and salutary exercise of poverty. Aquinas responds there to attacks levied by contemporary followers in gall of vigilantes against whom Jerome had defended several Christian practices, including voluntary poverty in the early fifth century. Aquinas's analysis of how voluntary poverty conduces to moral growth can be summarized as follows. The overarching rationale for the religious state within which a vow of poverty is made is to remove both occasions of sin, which destroy charity altogether and obstacles to perfect charity so as to attain Christian perfection. Whereas the degree of charity required for salvation is to love God above all things. The higher degree of charity to which religious life aspires is to make a complete holocaust, to offer oneself and one's possessions holy to God, refraining, even from lawful things so as to serve God as fully as possible. Because activities like marriage and worldly business, though not directly contrary to charity, can hinder the act of charity. The act of giving them up altogether prevents them from becoming an impediment to cultivating perfect love for God. This greater facility derives in part from the fact that one who lacks external possessions, a spouse, children, and the need to arrange one's own actions, need not be solicitous about any of them, and consequently experiences greater peace of mind that is more amenable to divine contemplation. Also for one, who otherwise would struggle with sin in one or more of these areas, the religious state offers a protective remedy by removing key occasions for arousing covetousness, bodily lost, and or a disordered will. The principle theological warrant for this lies in Jesus' example in teaching his own voluntary embrace of poverty is a way of life, indicates an abundance of humility, liberality and magnificence, and it bore much fruit peace in Christ amidst tribulations as possible. Now because Christ took away the weapons that the world uses to attack us. Theor of honors by his humility. The AOR of worldly pleasures by his sufferings and labors and the aor of riches by his poverty. Jesus's poverty function, not only Paradigmatically demonstrating that quote by loving poverty and temporal things, we are made rich in spiritual things, unquote, but also sacramentally by bestowing spiritual wealth upon us in his exegesis of Matthew five, three. Blessed are the poor in spirit. Aquinas follows Jerome and praising the interior voluntary choice to disown one's possessions, although who, although those who are spiritually detached from their possessions can merit heaven. Those who quote, neither have riches nor desire them, are more secure because the mind is drawn from spiritual things by riches. In his analysis of Jesus' dialogue with the rich young man, Aquinas concludes that the man loved God and neighbor and a man are sufficient for salvation without burden to self, but was unwilling to love one's neighbor to one's own detriment in accord with the way of perfection. Aquinas's language here is key. He explicitly acknowledges that the practice of voluntary poverty constitutes a burden gravamen, a trouble, burden, or physical inconvenience, and is detrimental. Detrimental. That which is worn away to oneself. But he maintains that such difficulty is worth enduring despite the suffering involved because it provides the occasion for growth in charity and the higher moral per perfection entailed by it. Citing Colossians three 14 Aquinas explains that the perfection of charity requires not only eradicating greed, but also loving God, quote even to the contempt of self and of his own things, unquote. Because, quote, being unburdened of these things, you'll be able to contemplate heavenly things more easily. Unquote. Forfeiting one's possessions, thus carries a twofold benefit for stalling greed, covetousness by eliminating the source of the temptation and freeing the mind for spiritual contemplation. But with the personal cost, that one literally must condemn Contempo, meaning to despise, disdain, or disregard one's own self. This latter, sacrificial aspect of voluntary poverty accords with his, with its nature as a radical form of discipleship, of following Christ, even to the cross if necessary. Although not all Christians are called to vow power, poverty, all are called to the interior self-denial that corresponds to it, at least to some degree. Although our Lord addressed the Council of Poverty individually to the rich young man a Aquinas, he nevertheless gave the same advice to all mankind. Matthew 1624. If anyone will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross and follow me. Aquinas then cites Christ Systems's, a vowel that Jesus's teaching was addressed to the whole world, man or woman, king Freeman or surf and Basil's. Description of self-denial as complete forgetfulness of past things and the abrogation of our own will, including the disposal of the property which we possess of our own will, like the disciples who left behind nets, boats, and Father. So to for the sake of Christ, we should give up All worldly occupation symbolized by the net riches are possession symbolized by the boat and carnal affection symbolized by the father. Although the. Actual renunciation of possessions is not required for perfection. Aquinas insists that one must be prepared in one's heart to renounce them if necessary, just as perfection. Consistent in a man's readiness to perform any work that might be required of him compared to the person who cultivates merely interior detachment. The person who exteriorly forfeits the entirety of his or her possessions for Christ's sake must endure greater suffering. Including both the hardships of poverty in the present and the fear of being destitute in the future. Fortunately, this greater suffering can foster greater moral growth, reflecting upon Paul's vowel that Christ's power is made perfect and weakness for the sake of Christ. I'm content with weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities for when I am weak, then I am strong. Second Corinthians 12, nine to 10 Aquinas argues that infirmity of various types conduces to virtue in two ways. First, it can provide the material on which to exercise virtue so as to strengthen the virtue in question, as in the case of one who must remain steadfast in faith amidst tribulation or cultivated in the first place, as in the case of one whose illness so weakens his appetite for food that he no longer desires it, immoderately. Second infirmity can provide the occasion to perfect the virtue just as already robust armies become even stronger by having a few remaining enemies left to fight. He then stipulates to additional positive effects garnered from Paul's experience. One, we can glory in the fact that such infirmities are supplied for our prophet and can join us closer to Christ. And two, we can experience joy stemming from the knowledge that Christ's power dwells within us in all tribulations. By practicing voluntary poverty and enduring the various hardships associated with it, one thus can attain perfect virtue in relation to material possessions, along with the spiritual confidence and joy inspired by suffering for Christ's sake, this perfection extends beyond mere detachment from material possessions to the point of despising them altogether. Reflecting on Jesus's proclamation that the world hates me because I bear witness against it for its works are evil. John six, seven, Aquinas starkly contrast the worldly, those who love what the world loves and agree with the world, with the saints who want what is displeasing to the world, poverty afflictions doing without food, and even disparage what the world loves. In fact, they despise the world. Galatians six 14, the world has been crucified to me and eye to the world, rather than glorying in the world. The saints seek a spiritual glory that will be attained in the future precisely on account of their sufferings and troubles in the present in accord with wisdom three six. He has tested them like gold in the furnace, and he accepted them as the victim of a holocaust. At the time of their visitation, they will shine. Although such thoroughgoing contempt of the world on the part of the will seems to violate the mean of virtue by under appreciating the essential value of temporal goods in sustaining bodily life. Aquinas defends it as consistent with the general trajectory of infused moral virtue. Quote, poverty abstains from all wealth for a right end and in a right manner, namely according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life, and only becomes excessive in situations where poverty is undertaken in an undue manner. For example, out of unlawful superstition or for vain glory. Accordingly, quote, those who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ and banish from their minds. All solicitude for temporal things are not prodigal, but perfectly liberal unquote, because external goods are ordained to the good of the body. Which itself is oriented to the good of the soul in situations where either the body's good or the soul's good would be enhanced by altogether refraining from possessing certain goods, which otherwise are beneficial to possess, such forfeiture would be reasonable rather than sinful. However, a special infusion of grace is needed to shift the person from the naturally virtuous act of using goods moderately to the super interrogatory act of despising them altogether time and time again. Aquinas associates radical diminishment of one's temporal wealth undertaken voluntarily for Christ's sake, with a correspondingly great increase in one's spiritual wealth. In his Galatians commentary, for example, Aquinas juxtaposes the person who glories and riches because he regards himself as great in wealth with the person who glories in Christ alone because he regards himself to be great in nothing but Christ. In his Ephesians commentary, he similarly contrasts the person who increases in material wealth. Job one 10, his possession has increased on the earth with the person who grows in spiritual goods by growing in both Christ and in the church. In his second Corinthians commentary, Aquinas distinguishes temporal things, transitory goods or evils from spiritual things, existent and true, and commends those who have forsaken all external things for possessing an inner greatness of heart because they lived for Christ rather than themselves. He then points out the irony in reference to Paul's depiction of his community, of believers as having nothing and yet possessing everything that quote, because all things are subject to Christ. Those who are so poor that they possess nothing except what they receive from others, in truth, possess all things and all things tend to their glory. It is faith that enables us to despise the riches of the world so that we are neither excessively attached to them in times of prosperity nor overly fearful in times of adversity as exhorted by one John five, four. This is the victory which overcomes the world, our faith. The person who perfectly fears God does not seek greatness and external goods, either honors or riches, but rather voluntarily renounces them at the Holy Spirit's instigation. One whose eyes are fixed on God can forego with confidence, the sensual happiness found in temporal, temporal, and perishable things for the more excellent and abundant happiness to be found in the kingdom of Heaven. The practice of voluntary poverty is strongly associated with the virtue of charity. Not only is greater charity the goal for which poverty is undertaken, charity is also the means by which poverty becomes spiritually fruitful, at least in part. Because, quote, the heart cannot be perfectly directed toward disparate things. No one can love both God and the world. Therefore, the more our heart is removed from love of earthly things, the more it is settled in divine love, unquote. Furthermore, Aquinas insists repeatedly that quote, to give up all once possession for Christ's sake, and to receive a little for one's livelihood is better than to give to the poor part by part unquote, not only because it constitutes a strong medicine for demolishing both covetousness and vain glory that results from riches and which otherwise could destroy charity freeze one immediately from all earthly solicited, which otherwise could impede growth in charity and facilitates greater divine contemplation, enabling one to draw closer to God, but also, and perhaps most pointedly, because it constitutes a greater gift of oneself to God. It belongs to the perfection of life. Explains Aquinas that a man follow Christ, not anyhow, but in such a way as to not turn back. Wherefore he says again, Luke 9 62, no man. Putting his hand to the plow and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God. All proper worship of God necessary for salvation necessitates some degree of sacrifice, but perfect worship of God entails sacrificing the entirety of oneself and one's possessions outta love for God. Indeed, Aquinas even goes so far as to argue that poverty not oriented to God and motivated by charity would not be meritorious reflecting upon the disciples who left behind their nets to follow Christ. Aquinas lauds their obedience not only for its promptness, but also for the commitment of love that undergirded it. Quote as to Disen encumbering themselves. One must not consider the amount but the affection. For one who leaves everything he could have leaves all things. It's no great thing to leave all things, but perfection consists in following, which is through charity. If one Corinthians 13, three, if I give away all that I have and if I deliver my body to be burned but have not love, I gain nothing on. When a person's heart is fixed solely on God, this produces both a contempt for riches and an immense readiness on the part of the soul to give. As with the Macedonians whom Paul praised for giving beyond their means, despite the fact that many of them suffered from extreme poverty to begin with, the love of God that comprises the virtue of charity, also expresses itself in love of neighbor. Consequently, a man fulfills the same end whether he f, whether he suffers the loss of his material goods for the love of God or for the sake of his neighbor, unquote, because Charity inclines a person to love his neighbor as himself. Leviticus 1918, it follows that just as a person rejoices in his own goods, so too should he rejoice in the goods of his neighbor. In his first Corinthians commentary, Aquinas reasons that quote, charity inclines a person not to keep the good things he has, but makes them flow to others. To give all of one's possessions to one's neighbor for God's sake and for the purpose of relieving a genuine need, rather than serving a superfluity epitomizes a radical sacrifice to God, despite the fact that it is indirect rather than direct. Aquinas accentuates this radicality when he asserts following Gregory, that quote, the renouncement of one's own wealth is compared to alms giving as the universal to the particular and as the holocaust to the sacrifice altogether. Aquinas sets forth two stages of moral growth concerning the will's relationship to material possessions, both of which require some degree of self-denial and the concomitant experiences of suffering that inevitably accompany it to accomplish, One. The initial shift from the vice of Covetousness whereby one perversely places, one's end in temporal things rather than in God to the natural virtue of liberality where one despises temporal things, but only as subordinate to God. And two, the subsequent shift from imperfect to perfect liberality whereby one despises temporal things and cleaves wholly to spiritual things. This ladder shift is accomplished most definitively by the practice of voluntary poverty. To his credit, Aquinas never seeks to glamorize being poor for the sake of God's kingdom, he limits himself to underscoring the inherent rationality of such a choice. Just as a person might choose a sad thing over something delightful in order to obtain a greater good or partake of a bitter potion in order to remedy an illness. So too, quote, the saints by hope of the ultimate end of eternal happiness, chose affliction and poverty over riches and pleasures because by them, they would've been hindered from attaining the end they hoped. In part one of my paper, which I skipped today, I argue that in order to acquire justices connected virtue of liberality, rightly ordered affections toward material possessions, the person enslaved to covetousness first must suffer by one, giving up the pleasure of being a possessor of riches. Two, forfeiting the natural comfort and delight supplied by the goods themselves. Three, undergoing any pain or affliction entailed by their loss. Four, experiencing the tangible fear of being poor from the future, stemming from the fact that he or she no longer possesses ample goods as a bulwark against destitution, and five potentially. Enduring the hardships of poverty in the present, the pain of which is palpably greater for those who are wealthy and completely unaccustomed to poverty. as I have argued this afternoon in part two of my paper, additional suffering consistent with the practice of voluntary poverty provides the occasion to perfect the infused version of this virtue whereby one despises temporal things and cleaves holy to spiritual things by conducing to growth and the virtue of justice. All these forms of suffering become morally meaningful, though without losing their character as suffering. God's providential design not only permits the evil of suffering, but also enables it to be therapeutic for moral development. Thank you.

8 1:20:37

So any questions?

14 1:20:41

thank you so much for your talk. my question, I guess, is more geared to the practical, So obviously we can recognize the good of, the poverty that is required in the religious life, but that is not the vocation of everyone. and so what do you think, invol or sorry, voluntary poverty looks like for, you know, a

1:21:03

mother or a father or someone who, that's a great question. I have a friend who was, in formation for religious life and then met a woman and discerned out and got married instead. And he tried at one point to live voluntary poverty in their marriage, which she was not thrilled with. so no, we don't need to hire a maid. We can do all the cleaning and everything ourselves, which means that you and I both need to do it. So she, she wasn't really thrilled about that plan. So, I do think there's a way in which you can say, if the goal is to be so detached from worldly things, that you despise them for the sake of God. I think it's possible to do that. but it's just harder when you don't have structures to be able to do it. So, Aquinas's point when he is talking about, the vows in the context of religious life is that all of these things make it much more likely that you'll be able to become perfected. So it's not, I don't think it's impossible to do it without, but like following your own will when you have to listen to a religious superior about everything and you can't make choices on your own, that's, he, he thinks that's the hardest of all. and that just isn't gonna pertain in other areas of life. You'll have more autonomy to follow your own will. so I think just for example, I would say. shifting to contemporary theology, we would say Vatican two is very clear. The human vocation is self-gift. And so all v Okay. Particular vocations live out self-gift in some form, either, in the context of marriage and family, you give yourself holy to your spouse and then your children, and then more indirectly to others or in the context of say, priesthood, religious life. But if you're a single person who's living celibacy for the kingdom temporarily or permanent, but not in the context of having a parish or being in a religious community, how do you live out that vocation? I think it's harder because you don't have people around you who you're responsible for giving yourself to. You don't have those structures. So it's possible, but you have to be much more intentional about how to structure your life to make it happen.

12 1:22:59

Yeah. I guess I just kind of following up on that line of thought, I am, I think I am trying to reconcile some of this because I am. Would've been totally on board before having children and now am, find it a per personal struggle because I guess we, my husband and I went from living somewhat of a existence, right. Gone to University, university and things. And then after having children, we would've been very happy to stay in very small spaces and had very few things, but found that in order to face totally well, right? You, I mean, I have five girls. If I don't keep a bunch of clothes around, I have to go look for them all the time. I mean, I, I have, I do have like a, just a natural Acadia to dealing with food and clothing and all those things, but I'm not supposed to have, because I'm a mother, so it's actually like a reverse thing where for me to grow in virtue as a mother, I'm supposed to be immersing myself more in the physical world than I would like. which is really confusing because, in order to train my daughters the way I, as I, for the kingdom and to level my spiritual things, I should almost be training them out of that. But I need to be trying to do the opposite. In order to take care of them well and live out this virtue. So there's a poverty of mother giving herself.

1:24:12

Yeah.

12 1:24:13

But via getting more immersed.

1:24:16

that's a great point. I think this is, I think this is one of the shortcomings with Aquinas. So if you look at the history of our tradition in terms of say, sex and marriage, he's a great improvement over Augustine because Augustine would say even in the context of marriage, sex is only good for the sake of procreation. So, I mean, he never would support something like natural family planning or a couple having relations during menopause because it would be venial, at least venial sin every time. Because you can't be intending procreation if it's impossible. There's no unit of meaning of sex for Augustine. By the time you get to Aquinas, he's much more positive that it doesn't matter if your passions overwhelm your sexual desire in the moment of sexual copulation with your spouse, as long as you are doing it with the right person at the right time in the crc right circumstance, it should be intensely pleasurable. And it doesn't matter if you can't do metaphysics and physics while you're engaged in the conjugal act. you're just shifting your attention from the good of contemplation to the good of the conjugal Act. So he's more positive, but he doesn't have yet a fully unitive understanding of sex and marriage. It's not till we really get to the 20th century that we have worked out understanding of the unitive meaning, of sex in addition to its procreative meaning, which you see laid out in human vitae. So Aquinas is a transitional figure in that sense in marriage. He's definitely hasn't made the transition because he's still part of the earlier paradigm that sees marriage as a bodily vocation to reproduce and. Celibacy for the kingdom is a spiritual vocation. So he doesn't see marriage as a vocation in which you are growing in holiness by virtue of the marriage, per se. so that's not worked out. It's not really, I think, until Vatican two, that you have a firm commitment that both marriage and celibacy are spiritual vocations because they both involve self-gift and growing and holiness, to which everyone is called. So, I think the most helpful example of what that looks like that I've seen is John Grobowski's book, sex and Virtue. He has two chapters on the Old Testament, new Testament, covenantal sexuality, and at the end of the New Testament chapter, he talks about, what would a spirituality of married sexuality looks like? And he suggests that we think of our, that we have a share in Christ's identity as pre priest, prophet, and king through our baptismal identity. And so he talks about the kingly dimension of making a gift of yourself for others, caring for their welfare, not just in the conjugal act in a special way, but every time you make a gift of yourself, for your spouse, for the good of your family, that's imitating Christ's kingship and sacrifice. So I think there's, that's an area that needs a lot of theological development, but Aquinas is. Is limited in that respect.'cause he is part of that older frame.

12 1:26:53

So he would've thought of the holy family, right? And Joseph needed to think about how to get them to Egypt and Mary needed to think about how to bake the bread.

1:26:59

You would think. But maybe if you're in a monastery in the 12 hundreds and you're teaching seminarians and you don't spend a lot of time with lay families and you're not in a parish, maybe you wouldn't have those encounters and that wouldn't come to mind.

1 1:27:12

we're just about to the end of our time, let's just take a moment to express our gratitude to all three of our very excellent speakers.