Rasheed: Hi everyone. And welcome back to the show. Today we are speaking with Dr. Ivelaw Griffith a former, vice chancellor of the University of Guyana, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as well as a fellow of the Caribbean Policy Consortium. The Venezuela-Guyana border crisis escalation has been all over the news the last couple of weeks, but often without much context or nuance. So this conversation is going to provide that context and nuance from one of the experts on this topic. So I hope you enjoy today's episode.
Thank you so much, Dr. Griffith, for joining me on the podcast today.
Ivelaw: Delighted to be here.
Rasheed: To start our conversation. Can you give us some context for what the Essequibo region is?
Ivelaw: This Essequibo territory is not a little piece of land. The Essequibo is 61,600 square miles. The Essequibo can fit Jamaica, 14 and a half times. The Essequibo can fit Barbados, and I was telling University of The West Indies TV viewers, can fit Barbados 371 times. The Essequibo is bigger than England. It is three times the size of Costa Rica.
We're talking about a significant territory. This is a territory that has gold, manganese, and bauxite. This is a territory that has Uranium. I did a study a few years ago for the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and I even have a map showing where in the Essequibo, in Guyana, and then the equivalent in Venezuela, there are uranium deposits.
As a matter of fact, President Ahmadinejad reached out to President Jagdeo a couple of ago. Jagdeo, went to Iran to start the conversation on Iranian interests in the Uranium deposits in Guyana for Iran's nuclear pursuits. So we're talking about a significant resource-rich area. Not only is there offshore oil, estimated to be 11 billion barrels equivalent, there is also onshore oil. There's gas. So we're talking about a sizable piece of land that is well endowed. But we also have people. Guyana has nine indigenous nations. Most of them are in the Essequibo, and so the identity of Guyana is wrapped up in the Essequibo. The average person who knows about Guyana's natural waterfalls would've heard of the Kaieteur, that's in the Essequibo, the Orinduik, the second highest falls is in the Essequibo, the majestic Essequibo River, the third largest river in South America. So we're talking about a significant part of Guyana, both in size and in resource. If the Venezuelans were to have their way, Guyana would be left with a little over 21, 000 square miles.
Guyana would be about half the size of Cuba. Guyanese and the world at large cannot afford to have seized territory by one mistake.
Rasheed: So, this is now a pretty hot topic in international policy or just even diplomacy conversations. I'm curious, how is it that this is even a potential topic to come up in 2023? What happened that Venezuela believes it has such a claim, essentially half the country of Guyana?
Ivelaw: Contrary to what may appear to be the reality, this is not a new claim, it's a claim that has been accentuated significantly post 2015 because of the discovery of massive offshore oil deposits in Guyana, but the historical backdrop to the claim goes back to 1841. And it goes back to the period of history when Guyana was a colony of the British Empire.
And there is an antecedent element where Venezuela was a colony of the Spanish Empire. When the British took control of the entire Guyana from the Dutch in 1814, one of the things that was not done was a clear demarcation of what is the British territory and the Venezuelan territory. Venezuela had gained independence from Spain earlier in 1811.
So what the British did was they hired a German explorer, a German geographer called Robert Schomburgk. And they said to Schomburgk, go to South America and tell us where the boundaries should be. That boundary demarcation became known as the Schomburgk Line. But the British took the Schomburgk Line as a de facto demarcation of the territory.
The Venezuelans did not. And the reasons the Venezuelans did not had significant to do with the relatively recent discovery of massive gold deposits in that part of South America. But keep in mind that you're talking 1840s, 1850s, which is shortly after a significant geopolitical development in the Americas. That geopolitical development is something called the Monroe Doctrine, where in 1823, President James Monroe, in a message to Congress, said significantly the following:
You colonial powers of Europe are not permitted to have further colonies in the Americas. You colonial powers of Europe are not allowed to disrupt countries that have become independent from colonial powers in the Americas. And so using the Monroe Doctrine, Venezuela approached the United States for help against Britain in settling this disputed Schomburgk Line.
The tensions were significant between Venezuela and Britain, to the point where Venezuela severed diplomatic relations with Britain. Venezuela continued to push the United States to protect it, under the Monroe Doctrine, to the point where the United States even threatened to go to war with Britain for that issue.
And in the context of lowering the decibel, Britain agreed with the American proposition to have an arbitration. They signed a treaty in 1895 in Washington agreeing to arbitration. And that treaty of Washington in 1895 says whenever the arbitration panel meets and decides, that decision will be the full and final demarcation of the boundary.
And so in 1899, when the arbitration panel finally gave its decision in an award called the Harris Award of 1899, Venezuela was not totally happy. Britain was not totally happy because nobody got exactly what they wanted. But they agreed. That agreement of 1899 led to actions in 1905 for a physical demarcation on the ground of the boundaries.
Britain sent a team, Venezuela sent a team, America had observers, but the demarcation was there. But I say all of this to say, Rasheed, that there's a historical backdrop to this. That goes way back to the previous century. But let me make one other point before I end this segment. Venezuela was so confident of America's protection under the rubric of the Monroe Doctrine that Venezuela agreed, the president at the time was Jose Andrade, they agreed to let America pick one of the arbitrators from Venezuela.
So there were two British arbitrators. There was one arbitrator named by President Andrade, who was an American judge, and Venezuela said, "America, you pick the other arbitrator." So there were two Americans who were actually representing Venezuela, two British, and under the treaty decided that the four would decide on the chairman of the panel. The four unanimously decided that there was an outstanding Russian legal scholar, Federico de Martens.
They agreed that de Martens was Russian, should be the chairman of this panel. There was a comfort level at the time where they said, okay, you don't have to trigger elements or the elements of the treaty. So this has a long historical background.
Rasheed: Fascinating. So, given the long historical backdrop, how has this evolved through time? For example, in Venezuela, is it typically thought of as this part of Guyana is, quote, "rightfully part of Venezuela?" Is that a kind of culturally known thing? Other parts of the world have maps drawn different ways in different countries. In Venezuela, is it understood, or even say, sentimentally understood, that this part of Guyana should truly be in Venezuela, even though there was this agreement back two centuries?
Ivelaw: Yes and no. After the 1899 arbitration, Venezuela accepted the word of the tribunal. They even gave an award to a member of the Venezuelan team, a guy called Severo Mallet-Prevost. They gave him the highest civilian award, the Order of the Liberators. There was acceptance of the territory, acceptance that Essequibo belongs to Britain up until the 1960s. Why are you asked up until the 1960s? Think of what were the international dynamics in the late 50s, early 60s. There was this Cold War going on. And in the context of this Cold War, there was this country called Cuba that had a revolution in 1959, had a guy called Fidel Castro who had clearly allied himself to the Soviet Union, the arch enemy of the United States.
You also had a rumblings of support of Fidel Castro in Guyana. You had a guy in Guyana called Dr. Cheddi Jagan. This guy called Cheddi Jagan had won the local elections. In several years in Guyana, the anxiety in the United States began to be raised that my God, it might very well be that we have another Cuba on our hands in South America.
And so it was on a visit of the President of the United States to Caracas in the early 60s, where the seeds were planted that we have to find a way to prevent this Fidel Castro alliance with this Cheddi Jagan in the impending new country called Guyana. And there's a memo written, and it became public just a few years ago under the Freedom of Information Act, indicating exactly what was the state of play in that conversation about what is the sense of geopolitics.
It was as a result of those concerns that Venezuela in 1962 first, raise the issue, as the talks about Guyana's independence were imminent, continuing, they started in London, they were continuing, 1961, 62, 63, seems as though Guyana was going to become independent. So Venezuela said, "look", they raised that matter in the United Nations General Assembly, "we know this Guyana is going to becoming independent, so we want to let you know, Mr. General Assembly, we have a concern about the boundary. with British Guiana owned by the United Kingdom." So 1962 was the first time Venezuela formally protested the border. And subsequent to 1962, and we can talk about some of those elements. They began to put a shaded map of Esequibo, they call "Zona en Reclamación", as part of the map of Venezuela.
So the 1960s onward, you've had a notion in Venezuela That there is a zone to be reclaimed. The zone in Guyana's nomenclature is the Essequibo part of Guyana. My first visit to Caracas was in 1981. And I was a journalist then. And I was going to Venezuela in the run up to the end of the Protocol of Port of Spain.
The Protocol of Port of Spain was an agreement signed in 1970, facilitated by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Eric Williams. You probably know that Venezuela has had a claim against Trinidad as well, historically. What Prime Minister Williams was able to do was to get Venezuela and Guyana to agree to a moratorium.
Let's not talk about territorial issues and accentuate this claim. Let's find a way to accentuate any positive relations between two neighboring countries. And the protocol said, let's do this for 12 years. And as we come to the end of the 12 years, let's talk about either renewing or not renewing. And so as the 12 years end was approaching, I went to Venezuela and I was struck by several things.
One, there was this map everywhere of La Zona. And two, the national anthem, a beautiful national anthem, oh yeah . National anthem playing all the time. I later learned the week I spent in Venezuela, it was part of the sentiment of keeping alive the spirit of nationalism, almost a jingoistic notion.
So ever since that period you've had in the psyche of Venezuelans, we would grow up in Guyana and Caribbean having these exercise books, the Venezuelan equivalent of La Zona. So it was this notion for quite a while that an injustice was done to Venezuela. And ultimately some point we will take this land back. We will reclaim this zone.
Rasheed: So it seems like the 1960s was a very pivotal moment for this Venezuela-Guyana boundary to reassert itself as an international problem. Could you give some more details? What exactly occurred into 1960s?
Ivelaw: It was unasserted between 1899 and 1962 but not totally accepted by all Venezuelans and the absence of total acceptance had to do with a letter written by one of the judges, one of the lawyers in the Venezuela team. The same guy who was given an award, Order of the Liberator, Severo Mallet-Prevost. Mallet-Prevost wrote a letter in 1944, which he asked to be kept not open until he dies.
When he died, his letter was opened. It was published in the American Journal of International Law. What the letter said is, "listen, Venezuela got a raw deal in 1899. The British and the Americans got together with the Russian guy and gave most of the land to Britain". So that letter from Severo Maletrevo was there as part of a backdrop of discontent but not acted on significantly.
And so the 1962 geopolitical dynamics where Venezuela was democratic, America was democratic, United States is democratic, but you have rumblings of left leaning governments in Cuba. Here comes this guy that might be led by Cheddi Jagan and who will be taking Guyana to be aligned with Cuba. That became an opportunity.
They said, "remember Mallet-Prevost letter. We were robbed. We've got to do something about it. Let's go to United Nations."
Rasheed: Was it seen as an opportunity because they thought America would back them with their claim at that time?
Ivelaw: Yes, and not only for pure economic interest. At the time, United States companies were the biggest investors in Venezuela.
United States had also suffered from what Fidel had done in nationalizing American interest in Cuba. So with this concern on the part of America and the American companies that we've got to side with this Venezuelan friend, because we've got interest in Venezuela. But we also have to worry about a next door neighbor to Venezuela becoming leftist.
Maybe some of the things that are capitalist interests might become non capitalist interests. There was a coincidence of economic and geopolitical interests, Venezuela and United States, that allow the sentiment of, "remember Mallet-Prevost letter. We got a raw deal. We've got to do something about it." That became a galvanizing element, allowing Venezuela in 1962 to formally protest the 1899 award.
Rasheed: Now, I think people tend to forget that the pre-Chávez Venezuela, is a very different country in many ways from where it is now.
Ivelaw: Absolutely.
Rasheed: Now after the moratorium, how did Venezuela go about to assert its legal claim as it were, to the Essequibo region using international courts?
Ivelaw: The protocol of Port-of-Spain was actually a protocol to the Geneva Agreement of 1966. And what the protocol said is, if the two parties agree not to renew, we will resort to the Geneva Agreement. The Geneva Agreement has a provision, Article 4, I think, that specifies what are the mechanisms to try to resolve the dispute. The mechanisms included having the United Nations Secretary General establish a good office, a kind of a mediator, to try to resolve the dispute.
That practice took several decades, several good offices, representatives of the Secretary General, nothing could come out of it. But the same Geneva Agreement also referred to Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. And under the Charter, there are several mechanisms to resolve disputes. One of those dispute mechanisms, dispute resolution mechanisms, is the International Court of Justice.
And so after several decades of failed efforts, under the Geneva Agreement, good offices by the Secretary General, Guyana asked the Secretary General of the United Nations to trigger that element of Article 33 involving the United Nations Judicial Order, the ICJ. Secretary General at the time said, let's give it one more try.
He appointed his own negotiator. They met, Venezuela was still adamant. They don't want anything to be discussed except La Zona is theirs. And so Guyana in 2018, with the facilitation of the secretary general, formally petitioned the ICJ. You know that on the ICJ rules, they can't automatically take a case requested by a party.
They've got to ask themselves, do we have the jurisdiction? And so the ICJ judges spend some time pondering this question. Does the ICJ have the jurisdiction? They came back in 2020 and said, yes, we have the jurisdiction. And therefore, Venezuela and Guyana put together their case called a memorial.
They gave Guyana time for its memorial. They gave Venezuela time for its counter memorial. Guyana submitted a memorial on time. But Venezuela threw a wrinkle in the proceedings, by using the very court procedures to file a preliminary objection, the preliminary objection said, look, since the United Kingdom was an initial party, a regional party to this dispute back in the 1890s, You, Mr. ICJ, cannot proceed on a case between, Venezuela and Guyana. It's got to involve Britain so this case can go forward. Hearings were held. Court reflected. After a while, they came back to say, Britain doesn't have to be part of this. And Britain doesn't have to be part of this because of the very 1966 Geneva agreement.
Venezuela, of course, did not accept, but the matter is proceeding. And so you're at a point where the court has allowed Venezuela until 2024, March, I think to submit its counter memorial, the expectation being that by 2025, the court will render a substantive decision on the petition made of 2018. But you know that in the last few weeks, there have been some new wrinkles, which involve the ICJ again.
And the new wrinkle has to do with that announcement by Venezuela that they intend to hold a referendum. And it's the announcement about the referendum and the five questions that the referendum is supposed to ponder that moved Guyana to ask the ICJ for some provisional measures to prevent Venezuela from going forward.
The ICJ held hearings again, came back and said "Venezuela", they said it I think on December 1st, "you are not allowed to do anything to alter the status quo until the substantive case judgment is rendered." Venezuela went ahead anyhow held a referendum, they claimed 95 percent of the people who voted gave them permission.
And in the context of the referendum's outcome, by their definition of outcomes, they have not pushed the envelope to the brink of what I call the precipice conflict. How have they done that? They have declared what they used to be called La Zona en Reclamación, the Guayana Esequiba, the 24th state. They have said they will be giving identity cards to the people who live in the Esequiba.
They have said in that referendum, the ICJ's jurisdiction is rejected. They have said the Geneva Agreement is the only basis for a resolution of this dispute. And they have this mistaken notion that the Geneva Agreement requires Guyana and Venezuela to have a bilateral settlement. No such thing! You can read the Geneva Agreement in any of the languages in which it is written and find no mandate for the two parties to have a bilateral settlement.
We've pushed this false narrative for a long time, and so I think In terms of reasonable expectations going forward, Venezuela has pushed the envelope on the intimidation, what I call the bullyism, they have made it very uncomfortable for a climate of peace to exist. But for reasons I have explained to folk, including this morning with a colleague of journalists in London, Maduro has much more to lose than to risk by going to annex physically Guyana.
Rasheed: Before we go there to the bullyism question. I want to go back to something you said. Why? Why do you think that Maduro even pushed the ball this far forward at this point with the Venezuela referendum and so on? There doesn't seem to be a very good reason for doing this..
Ivelaw: Good reason. And a good reason has to do with his own desire to retain power beyond 2024. Any national elections are going to be pre scheduled to be held, they have to be held. Presidential elections are due in 2024. National assembly elections are due in 2025.
Essequibo issue for several decades has been used as a political football domestically. Not only in the presidential elections, but in the national assembly election, even some mayoral election, as has been done in other parts of the world. If you can find a common enemy that is external to you to galvanize your people to be in your corner, you do it!. And my sense is that they are domestic political vicissitudes at work, which have meant not only is Nicolás Maduro looking at the international dimension, he is seeing some possible benefits to his retaining power if he were to galvanize a kind of a jingoism within his nation. But for me, even though Maduro has been erratic in some of what he did, and even though a pre-Maduro regime annexed part of Guyana, it's a footnoted issue that many people forget.
A few months after Guyana became independent in 1966, Venezuelan military forces physically seized a part of Guyana called Ancoco. All right, they're still there, they've taken the whole island. But it's one thing to seize a part of a little island, 270 miles, it's another thing to take 74 percent of your neighboring country. . And so there is much more at stake than the domestic political considerations. And why I don't think it is even an erratic and probably irrational in the mind of some people. I don't know, possible, or probable, there was this country called Brazil.
This country called Brazil is, for me, not simply the Leviathan of South America. It's the Leviathan of South America that has a border with every other South American country except Chile and Ecuador. And some of those borders are also in dispute. If Brazil were to allow Venezuela to change by force the border with Guyana, to open a Pandora's box about its own borders in other parts of South America.
You can't afford that.
Rasheed: Why do you think that cascade would happen?
Ivelaw: It will happen because there are rumblings in some of those borders. Uruguay, for example, is not happy with their border. You know that France and Brazil have a border in South America called French Guiana. That border. Is also a dispute.
There is a dispute over borders between Venezuela and Colombia. If one South American country is able to radically alter the border, it'll open conversations about border alterations in other parts of this, of the continent. But not only, I think because of Brazilian national interests, regarding borders is a Leviathan, Brazil is a stumbling block to accessing and annexing Guyana.
If you look at the geography of that part of South America, there are two ways By which the Venezuelan armed forces can cross into Guyana. There's a neighboring state called Bolivar. But that neighboring state's terrain and geography would make it extremely difficult without constructing roads and bridges to get from Bolivar to Guyana.
There's another access point. That other access point is in the state of Roraima, Brazil. I've been to Roraima, I've been to Brasilia, driving from Guyana to Boa Vista, and then flying to Brasilia. But the Brazilians have made it quite clear they do not intend to allow Venezuelan armed forces to transit their state of Roraima to get to Guyana.
As a matter of fact, not only have they heightened the state of their military alert, they've sent reinforcements of troops into Roraima last week. Clearly signaling. So if Venezuela's thinking of how do I get to see this land? It can do another thing, which is not very feasible militarily. It can access through the Atlantic.
That's a much more difficult proposition. So I think for the Brazilian self interest, Brazil would not be interested and they've made it quite clear. But it's not only Brazil that would be looking at scans and has been working to prevent. The United States has made it quite clear that although they have not said it, we know that some of the interests are economic interests.
U. S. companies are major stakeholders in the oil venture. The oil venture, the Stabroek block, the consortium that started the discovery in 2015, was a tripartite. Consortium. ExxonMobil, Hess and a Chinese company, Sinoc. Last month, two months ago, Chevron, another giant owned by the United States, Chevron company, bought out the Hess.
So there are significant American corporate interests. Disrupting the peace and stability would not be in the interest of those companies, and would not be in the interest of the United States. This partly explains why the United States have begun to do overflights, military overflights with the Guyana Defense Force in Guyana, sending a clear signal. Plus, there are other considerations. I was telling folks on the University of the West Indies TV program two nights ago, that there are direct implications for CARICOM countries.
And there are even military implications for CARICOM, some CARICOM countries. Guyana joined the Regional Security System last year, you may or may not know that the regional security system operates under a treaty where there's a mutual assistance provision, Article four and Article four quite clearly says you attack one limb of the RSS, the others are obligated to come and help.
So it would mean that if there's a physical annexation, RSS forces will have to be managed out of Barbados to help Guyana not large forces, but it will inevitably mean that some Caribbean citizens other than Guyanese stand to be physically harmed in trying to deal with the circumstance. And so for those and several other reasons, the Chinese have interests there too, have interests both in Venezuela and Guyana - mining, oil. They're building the bridge between one of the bridges in Guyana. They put in a bid to the bridge between Guyana and Suriname and although they are not vocal, I suspect they're working behind the scenes to lower the decibel to calm the waters. But I think the 2024 elections are going to see a driving of this agenda for a while domestically in Venezuela.
Hopefully the ICJ will make its judgment by 2025, 26.
Rasheed: What's your view on the response by other Caribbean countries to this recent escalation? I ask this in the context of PetroCaribe and Ralph Gonsalves. So right now, today, there are talks being held by President Ali of Guyana and the President Maduro of Venezuela in Saint Vincent. And Ralph Gonsalves has been, I guess, in my view, very neutral to put it mildly, on the escalation. Because he is very essentially pro-Venezuela. For various reasons.
So I'm wondering how you think the other Caribbean countries should have or have responded?
Ivelaw: Some Caribbean countries have been walking a thin line between vocally supporting Guyana and trying to avoid upsetting Caracas, primarily because of PetroCaribe's potential reestablishment. PetroCaribe failed in 2019 for a combination of domestic issues and American sanctions. But two years ago, Maduro began to dangle in the Caribbean, the prospects of reestablishing. That has led to several bilateral visits by Caribbean leaders to Caracas, hoping to begin whatever new deal it led last year, and which is why some people are skeptical about how above board Prime Minister González is.
Last year, Venezuela wrote off the entire debt of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in relation to PetroCaribe. So, you had CARICOM Secretariat making a strong statement, but there were some weak comments by certain Caribbean countries, which led people to worry about the solidarity level of CARICOM.
Thankfully, in the last few weeks, you've seen a much more resounding sentiment of support. But part of that appearance of diffidence, thankfully changed in the last few days, also was coming from Trinidad and Tobago. And it was coming from Trinidad and Tobago because Trinidad and Tobago for several years has been pushing to have a deal with Venezuela on gas, natural gas.
That seems to be coming to pass, the Dragon Gas Project. And they're torn between being too strongly condemnatory of Venezuela in light to the fact that they've got their own national interests in it. It was good to see that two days ago, the Prime Minister of Trinidad said he's going to be going to Saint Vincent also on Thursday. Maduro is going to be going. Ali is going to be going. Prime Minister Mottley is going to be going. Trinidad and Tobago's leaders going to be going. CARICOM Secretary General, is sending a representative. Brazil is sending a representative. The Secretary General is sending a representative.
Maybe there'll be a conversation. But the conversation will not be about the territorial dispute, because Guyana has made it quite lucid that the matter needs to work its way through the International Court of Justice. Any effort from a bilateral deal will undermine what the ICJ has begun to do.
And the ICJ said it. Guyana is adamant that we will meet, but we will not discuss what Mr. Maduro wants. And what he has long wanted, what several leaders in Venezuela have long wanted, is a bilateral negotiation. Give me a piece of this territory here. Give me access to the Atlantic here.
Rasheed: Do you think that en net the international community has been thinking or talking about this issue with enough nuance?
Ivelaw: I think it's becoming a better understood topic for two reasons, because of the significant potential wealth of Guyana given the oil discoveries, and there is now a recognition that 11 billion barrels would just be the tip of the iceberg.
But it's also becoming a better understood reason because of recent annexation of territory elsewhere. So the notion of one country going into another is in the international public space, and this case represents. a potential one country going in and taking another and taking not just a little piece of another, taking most of the other.
74% of Guyana is the Essequibo. So I think over time we've begun to see a number of conversations in official and in public and in media spaces about what this can represent, not solely because of this "land of many waters" called Guyana. But because this land of many waters called Guyana is a growing petrol power, because there is concern with issues of political management in Venezuela that has led so many Venezuelans to flee, presenting a burden to Colombia, presenting a burden to Trinidad and Tobago, a burden to Brazil.
A burden to countries all the way down as far as Chile, the Venezuelans have been fleeing. So, the migration, the political issues in Caracas, in Venezuela itself, the potential that Guyana, this up and coming petro power, is facing this threat, the concern about annexation elsewhere significantly in Europe, all combined together are allowing people to get a better appreciation of the dynamics of this controversy.
Rasheed: How is this issue being perceived typically domestically in Guyana?
Ivelaw: It's a combination of the following: strong national sense of nationhood and solidarity, but mixed feelings because of some of the internal political racial dynamic, mixed feelings by parts of the community, especially the Afro Guyanese community, that "why should we fight for this government?"
You're not seeing it so much as a nation issue, as a government issue, when so much of this government is doing things injurious to black people. One of the harsh realities of Guyana's military services is that most of the army, most of the police, is Afro Guyanese. So Afro Guyanese are going to be saying, have been saying, "Hey, we're the ones who are going to be dying if there is a physical fight."
Why should we behold to this government in the context of what this government is doing to us? It may take issues with the perception, but as you know, in life, sometimes perception is reality. And so because of the racial political dynamics in parts of Guyana, there is some reluctance to fully embrace this national defense mode that is being promoted.
Rasheed: Thank you so much, Dr. Griffin, for this fascinating conversation about the current border crisis in Guyana and Venezuela. And I honestly will be looking to see to see what ICJ says soon, and hopefully there's no further escalation.
Ivelaw: Thank you, Rasheed.
Reading:
Dr. Ivelaw Griffith on LinkedIn
Rasheed Griffith on X (formerly Twitter)
For updates about the podcast, please subscribe to our Substack blog found on cpsi.media. You can also read our newsletters and long form content on Caribbean policy improvements.