Could a grandmother who foots the bill for her grandchild's medical expenses in the wake of a crime be the rightful recipient of restitution? Join us as attorneys and the Supreme Court of Virginia unravel the legal labyrinth in the Commonwealth vs. Puckett case, with insights from legal experts Jordan Minot and Graham Bryant. The arguments navigate the murky waters of legal definitions, reevaluating the concept of a 'victim' with broader implications, and questioning whether indirect financial casualties of crime should be eligible for restitution.
Diving deeper, the parties toss around the broader interpretation of 'incur' in relation to medical expenses and restitution. They pull examples from the AV Automotive, the State Farm, and the Bowers decisions to provide a diverse, contextual understanding. Ponder with us, as they delve into the potential ramifications of a volunteer bearing medical costs and whether such interpretation of 'incur' aligns with the canon of construction for restitution statutes.
Lastly, the arguments dissect the statutory structure of restitution in Virginia, a state which offers broad discretion in restitution awards and commands restitution in certain circumstances. As they wrap up, they reflect on the broader implications of such definitions of 'victim' and 'incur' in the restitution context. They also discuss how the General Assembly might have incorporated qualifying language into the statute and whether the statute, in its current form, still fulfills the objectives of restitution. Join us for this enlightening conversation, offering a fresh perspective on restitution for medical expenses in crimes.
This podcast is brought to you by Virginia Injury and Disability law firm, Ben Glass Law.
Real legal help for real people
Your life has been disrupted. You have good doctors and they support you. Your personal injury or long-term disability claim seems like a slam dunk. But there’s a problem: The insurance company doesn’t believe you. “You can’t be hurt that bad! Our medical experts say you’re fine.”
You need a trusted advocate who can uncover all the facts, tell your story to the skeptical insurance company, and get you the money you deserve. You don’t have to do this alone. Contact our Virginia personal injury and long-term disability lawyers today for a free consultation or denial letter review.
Could a grandmother who foots the bill for her grandchild's medical expenses in the wake of a crime be the rightful recipient of restitution? Join us as attorneys and the Supreme Court of Virginia unravel the legal labyrinth in the Commonwealth vs. Puckett case, with insights from legal experts Jordan Minot and Graham Bryant. The arguments navigate the murky waters of legal definitions, reevaluating the concept of a 'victim' with broader implications, and questioning whether indirect financial casualties of crime should be eligible for restitution.
Diving deeper, the parties toss around the broader interpretation of 'incur' in relation to medical expenses and restitution. They pull examples from the AV Automotive, the State Farm, and the Bowers decisions to provide a diverse, contextual understanding. Ponder with us, as they delve into the potential ramifications of a volunteer bearing medical costs and whether such interpretation of 'incur' aligns with the canon of construction for restitution statutes.
Lastly, the arguments dissect the statutory structure of restitution in Virginia, a state which offers broad discretion in restitution awards and commands restitution in certain circumstances. As they wrap up, they reflect on the broader implications of such definitions of 'victim' and 'incur' in the restitution context. They also discuss how the General Assembly might have incorporated qualifying language into the statute and whether the statute, in its current form, still fulfills the objectives of restitution. Join us for this enlightening conversation, offering a fresh perspective on restitution for medical expenses in crimes.
This podcast is brought to you by Virginia Injury and Disability law firm, Ben Glass Law.
Real legal help for real people
Your life has been disrupted. You have good doctors and they support you. Your personal injury or long-term disability claim seems like a slam dunk. But there’s a problem: The insurance company doesn’t believe you. “You can’t be hurt that bad! Our medical experts say you’re fine.”
You need a trusted advocate who can uncover all the facts, tell your story to the skeptical insurance company, and get you the money you deserve. You don’t have to do this alone. Contact our Virginia personal injury and long-term disability lawyers today for a free consultation or denial letter review.
For example, your first remark was DMS had a legal obligation. Forget DMS. It's the Commonwealth of Virginia that's paying this money. Right, commonwealth volunteered to pay the money. The general assembly got together and said why don't we pay this money to victims of crime? I think that's great policy, but that's a volunteer. Would your argument still be the same if the grandmother of the victim paid the medical bills? Would the grandmother get the restitution, even though there's no legal obligation with the grandmother today?
Speaker 2:
I suppose it depends. Your honor, I agree that's a much closer case than this one.
Speaker 3:
Welcome to the Supreme Court of Virginia podcast. This podcast is brought to you by Ben Glass Law, a personal injury and long-term disability law firm with headquarters in Fairfax, Virginia. Listening to oral arguments is one of the best ways to both learn and stay abreast of the substantive and procedural aspects of practicing law in Virginia. By putting these public domain recordings into the form of a podcast, Ben Glass Law has made it easy for the public to access these recordings. All commentary that is not part of the actual court proceedings is that of the show's sponsor.
Speaker 4:
Commonwealth versus Puckett. Graham Kay Bright, Deputy Solicitor General, and Jordan Minot, Owens Council. Jason S Eisner, Abbey's Council. I will just note for the individuals listening to this by video that Justice, Senior Justice Millette, is sitting for Justice Russell.
Speaker 2:
Go ahead. Good morning, Mr Chief Justice. May it please the court? I'm Jordan Minot. I'm joined by Graham Bryant, who's migrated over to this table this morning. I would like to reserve three minutes for a bottle, please.
Speaker 4:
All right.
Speaker 2:
Larry Puckett brutally stabbed Justin Hawks and was convicted for that offense of malicious wounding. As part of sentencing the Circuit Court ordered that Mr Puckett make restitution to the Department of Medical Services, or DMAS, for life-saving medical treatment that was rendered to save Mr Hawks' life. The Circuit Court's imposition of restitution was correct. Code section 19.2-305.1b requires that a court order restitution when there are quote any medical expenses that are quote incurred by the victim as a result of a crime. Here the Circuit Court was correct that DMAS was a victim of Puckett's crime by the plain meaning of the term victim. But even if the Circuit Court was incorrect that DMAS was a victim of Puckett's crime, restitution would still be due under 305.1b because a victim of Puckett's crime incurred medical expenses that DMAS then paid. I'll begin with why the Circuit Court was correct.
Speaker 5:
D mass is a victim under the meaning of three B because the plain meaning of victim encompasses deep Is it different that the Commonwealth has legislatively ordinarily would have no obligation to pay anything, but then it voluntarily enacts legislation to say we'll do this. So isn't that a little different than a victim who is just helpless and subjected to some criminal predation? Aren't we talking about apples and oranges?
Speaker 2:
I don't think so, your Honor. I think that by its legal obligation to pay people in Mr Hawks' position, d mass is in fact helpless and subject to a loss because of Puckett's crime. D mass cannot shirk its legal obligation to cover people like Mr Hawks, and so therefore D mass, because it must pay for these medical expenses, isn't a similarly helpful Is it anyone who has any kind of, no matter how far down the chain, has any kind of impact or detriment?
Speaker 5:
They're a victim under this expansive definition. So you witnessed it from afar. Now you have to go get counseling because you're having nightmares or whatever. You're a victim. Now Defendant must pay for the counseling. Where would we draw the line?
Speaker 2:
I don't think that's the case, your Honor, and I have two reasons for that. First, this this provision of the statute is limited to medical expenses and D mass has a legal obligation that it can't avoid to pay medical expenses in certain circumstances, much like a private insurer who we think would be treated the same as D mass. The second response to your question is that what the General Assembly intended to do with 305.1 b is confer broad discretion on the trial court went to order restitution and that this court's decision in Peyton explains that the purposes of restitution are quote highly remedial and restitution statutes are to be quote liberally construed.
Speaker 2:
One significant constraint on to whom in the universe restitution may be paid and for what expenses? Is the sound discretion of the trial court, who must make various findings as part of sentencing and the award of restitution?
Speaker 4:
Let me ask your question, though. 19.2 dash 305.1 does not require that the person receiving restitution necessarily be a victim, does it?
Speaker 2:
That's correct, mr Chief Justice. It does not require that the person the victim be paid restitution. However, it does require that a victim incurring medical expenses is what triggers the requirement of restitution.
Speaker 4:
But you wanted to say that D mass is a victim. Whether they're a victim or not, they still could be entitled to restitution right.
Speaker 2:
I agree, Mr Chief Justice. However, the trial court's finding in this particular case was that D mass was a victim because it suffered a loss as a result of Puckett's crime in paying Hawks' medical expenses, and we think that decision of the circuit court is correct. That is not the only route that D mass might have been awarded restitution in this case, but in this case that is what the trial court did and we believe it's correct.
Speaker 6:
If we disagree with D mass being a victim, where does that leave you?
Speaker 2:
That leads us to our alternative argument, your Honor, in which if you assume that D mass is not a victim which again we assert that they are then indisputably Mr Hawks is a victim of Puckett's crime and Mr Hawks incurred medical expenses. Those medical expenses were then paid by D mass.
Speaker 6:
Let me focus your attention on the Court of Appeals decision where, in finding that D mass is not a victim, they go on to say it was not established that these medical expenses were incurred by the victim of Puckett's malicious wounding. They say need the party briefed or argued whether a victim incurs a charge, etc. So is that issue before us? Can we reach whether it was incurred?
Speaker 2:
I believe so, your Honor. I'll point out to the Court that the proceedings before the Court of Appeals was an appeal of the entire sentence imposed on Mr Puckett, and the briefing covered the litany of challenges that he made to that sentence, this restitution point being only a small part of that challenge. I'll also note that the Court of Appeals addressed this issue and made findings as to what it believes, or holdings, rather as to what it believes the definition of incurred was, and then both parties before you today have briefed the issue and neither party has asserted a waiver. So I think that this issue, especially on a de novo issue like this, is before the Court. That said, I do think that the Court of Appeals definition of incur was incorrect.
Speaker 2:
The Court of Appeals used a narrow definition of incur that applies in the Medicaid spend-down provisions and rejected this Court's definition in bowers. Bowers, however, is a much closer analog to this case. Bowers involved an interpretation of what incurred means with reference to medical expenses, and this Court, since the Court of Appeals decision, has reaffirmed that decision or that interpretation of incurred in AV Automotive. Both of those decisions used a definition of incurred that hold that expenses incurred when an entity or person assumes a legal obligation to pay something and in this case Mr Hawks incurred a medical expense because he had a legal obligation to pay it. D-mass then came and covered that medical expense, but Mr Hawks really a victim incurred the medical expense when he initially became legally obligated to pay it, had D-Mass not stepped in. Now that is a much broader definition than the Court of Appeals used, but it is a more natural definition that comports with the general remedial purpose of restitution.
Speaker 1:
I hate to make the point. But AV Automotive, of course, was not a 7-0 opinion and there was a dissent. The word incurred has an elastic range, doesn't it? And if we were going to cherry pick one episode of us applying incurred to this scenario and that scenario, I'm not sure where this is going to go, because the dictionary has several different ways of interpreting the directness or the indirectness of incurred. For example, your first remark was D-Mass had a legal obligation. Forget D-Mass, it's the Commonwealth of Virginia that's paying this money. Right, commonwealth volunteered to pay the money. General Assembly got together and said why don't we pay this money to victims of crime? I think that's great policy, but that's a volunteer. Would your argument still be the same if the grandmother of the victim paid the medical bills? Would the grandmother get the restitution, even though there was no legal obligation of the grandmother to pay?
Speaker 2:
I suppose it depends, your honor. I agree that's a much closer case than this one. In this situation, d-mass does have a legal obligation. I agree that's a choice that the General Assembly made. But it's also a choice that the General Assembly made to draw this statute in a permissive way, with the understanding that restitution statutes are to be interpreted broadly. I agree with your honor that the definition of incurred has a range of permissible interpretations. But given the canon of construction that we are given for remedial I'm sorry for restitution statutes, I think that the broader interpretation is the one that makes the most sense, particularly in light with the way that the General Assembly has drafted so correct me if I'm wrong, but in AV Automotive it was a volunteer argument.
Speaker 1:
The payment was by someone who was not herself or himself can't remember legally obligated, and yet it still fit within the incurred. But that was a situation where there was no by the victim. There was no prepositional phrase that qualified the word incurred right and that was actually the reason for the dispute on the court is that it was just the word in the abstraction context. But here we have a qualification incurred by the victim, which would obviously mean if the victim of crime had to pay the medical expense. Of course it may arguably mean if the victim had some contractual payment made to someone like an insurance company. Insurance company pays it. But the question now is what if a volunteer pays it? Either the grandmother or the common of Virginia volunteers to pay.
Speaker 2:
I'm not. I'll caveat, your Honor, that this court need not rely on AV Automotive in that heavy of a way, because the Bauer's decision or even the earlier state farm decision, interpret, incur in a medical expense context. I believe state farm is medical expense context. I might be wrong there, but Bauer certainly is. In a broader way that comports with this. So the volunteer situation is not necessarily before this court. In this situation D-MAS is not in the same sense as in AV Automotive a volunteer. And then again, your Honor, I'll point to the canon of construction that we have for these particular statutes. Av Automotive involved a sanctions motion and attorney's fees, which is not given the same presumption that a remedial statute awarding restitution is. So I understand, your Honor, his concern with placing that kind of weight on AV Automotive, but I just don't think it's necessary here.
Speaker 5:
And your backup argument goes directly to Justice Kelsey's question, which is this defendant, even though he didn't in the end have to pay it, because he probably didn't have the means, but he did benefit from this medical care and, at least notionally, he was on the hook to pay it.
Speaker 2:
That's right, your Honor. In the absence of D-MAS, he would have been on the hook to pay it, and so the award. Essentially, what this interpretation of the restitution statute means is that Mr Puckett is held to the cost of his crime, regardless of who ultimately pays the medical expense. His him having to account for the full cost of his crime or the cost of his crime is the same, irrespective of whether a private insurer pays, a state insurer pays or Mr Hawks himself pays, and that is the reason for the interpretive canon that I've been discussing about the remedial nature of restitution statutes is to have the person convicted of the crime pay for the cost of their crime. If there are no further questions, I'd like to reserve the remainder for rebuttal.
Speaker 4:
All right, thank you, counsel. You have three minutes and nine seconds.
Speaker 3:
This podcast is brought to you by Ben Glass Law, a national leader in long-term disability insurance claims. We help doctors, lawyers, entrepreneurs, ceos and other C-suite executives get paid for their long-term disability benefits. Visit us at benglaslawcom or give us a call at 703-591-9829.
Speaker 7:
Good morning, may it please the court? Jason Eisen from Danville, on behalf of Mr Puckett, I have been specifically requested to pass the regards of Leah Haskins to the Chief Justice, or at least by her mother. It would be at her daughter or mother regards we conveyed. So thank you very much. With respect to the issue before us today, it really is a straightforward issue. I didn't come up much in argument, but how many times in the briefs for the commonwealth to be seen that we're not supposed to add language to statute. We're not supposed to give the words of a statute improper meaning, which basically the exact opposite in our position what they're asking the court to do today? We can begin just by looking at the statute on its face and examining in isolation we don't end there, but we certainly begin there saying that it does require a restitution for medical expenses to be paid to the victim or victims of state. So again we have a stab in case under the circumstances.
Speaker 4:
What requires is restitution to be paid to a victim.
Speaker 7:
Under section 19.2-305.1, so we're looking at the trial court shall order restitution of any medical expenses incurred by the victim or by the victims of state.
Speaker 4:
But it doesn't say who's paid to. Does it?
Speaker 7:
It doesn't appear to you, it would say that it's supposed to be incurred by the victim, right, it's?
Speaker 4:
incurred, but it doesn't say who the restitution is paid to.
Speaker 7:
And you're wondering, it's worth being incurred by.
Speaker 7:
One of the biggest issues too, in terms of going over the background case law in this case too, and I'm not aware of any case law in which you have a situation where you have party A that has some sort of cost as a result of a crime or a tort, but a party B paid for it. So therefore, restitution or a cost of your work to party B, it comes down to party A. So we look at, for example, in AV Automotive I probably can't pronounce the other name there, but in that case of course you had attorney's fees and it's different from restitution. But again, party B paid for the attorney's fees. So they still go to the person who, as court found, incurred the attorney's fees.
Speaker 4:
So Well, why wouldn't the court have the inherent authority to have the restitution paid to whoever they want to have it paid to, whoever they think deserves to be to receive the restitution. Why are there restriction on that?
Speaker 7:
You're on to submit Again, that would be adding language to the statute, though the statute does say incurred by the victim. I agree with you on that, and we're playing loosely. And I think there's got to be a point where we have to make a common sense determination as far as what the language of statute authorizes and what the General Assembly intended here. And if we step out, we zoom out a bit from this specific statute and look at the entire restitution statutory scheme, you've got section 19.2-3. You've got section 19.2-3-5. And they use the term aggrieved parties. We have a grieved party in one statute or two statutes and we have victim in the statute before it's court today. And under those circumstances what we see is the General Assembly has recognized that there exists a class of persons and or entities that can be affected by crime, but they're not a victim. But we should recognize their standing as having been affected by the crime and recognize that the trial court should have some degree of ability to order the restitution to be paid to an aggrieved party.
Speaker 1:
I'm sorry to interrupt you, but, going back to AV Automotive, one of the one of the full complaints was there was a legal liability to pay, right. So here the legal liability is the victim having to pay. If someone else doesn't pay at the medical bills, I don't know it. That's what the court said, that's what incurred means and that's not an absurd interpretation. It wasn't fully agreed to, but it was a reasonable one and a legitimate one. Why isn't it enough? Why isn't it as simple as that? Whether I agree with it or not, why is it as simple as that?
Speaker 7:
Your Honor if we're talking about the definition of incur and there's different means, but the court basically have to change its definition. From Bowers we're dealing with this court's previously assigned definition, in which he either paid the expenses or became legally obligated to pay the expenses. We do not can see the Mr Hawks incurred the expenses.
Speaker 1:
Pay the expense or became legally obligated to pay the expense.
Speaker 7:
Correct.
Speaker 1:
The victim was legally obligated to pay the expenses. The victim didn't.
Speaker 7:
We know the victim did not pay the expenses here. But our position is we look at the regulations for Jim Mr Code signed by the Court of Appeals, which basically lays out the obligations under DMS under circumstances. So it becomes a question as far as does the medical provider seek to collect from Mr Hawks before it seeks to collect from DMS? So which was not presented to the trial court.
Speaker 1:
but that would be our position if they come after him saying okay, Obviously a legal liability, whatever the government does or doesn't do. If you go to a doctor and a doctor, there's going to be an implied and law contract and applied and that contract and you're going to have to pay something reasonable.
Speaker 7:
It's reasonable Someone doesn't bail you out and we're talking about potentially a voluntary visit to the doctor as well. Does it change? I'd submit that Mr Hawks, of course, had sustained some injuries, he'd been brought to the hospital for treatment. And again we're getting to a practical standpoint. This is all material not presented to trial court. But the hospital determines who your provider is, who your third party payer is, and so if it turns out it's DMS under the Virginia Administrative Code, they go to DMS for the money. We would not conceive that Mr Hawks meant either definition of incurring. But even our position is still if he did make that definition, again we're still looking under the avi-autotype of situation. If the court does find that Mr Hawks incurred these medical expenses, it does not authorize that the trial or require the trial court Section 19.2-3.1, to award the restitution to the payer, to the party that paid the expense. Mr Hawks occurred and thankfully the question is not before as far as I.
Speaker 1:
apologize for interrupting, ken, but the Chiefs just asked you a great question. The statute doesn't say to whom you make the payment, it just says who incurred the expense, right? Am I misreading something?
Speaker 7:
So the person commits. Excuse me, shall I make at least partial restitution for any property damage or loss caused by the crime or for any medical expenses incurred by the victim of the estate as a result of the crime? The statute is silent on that. But again, our position is the fact that silent doesn't mean it can be interpreted as state that we can just award off restitution to basically any individuals involved, particularly when we've seen the rest of statutory context and the General Assembly has recognized as other class of individuals. And unfortunately I think we all know what's going to happen if this Court of Appeals affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. But the rest of the statutory scheme does indeed exist and does specifically say we can consider an aggrieved party, we can consider somebody a person and he or have you that has to be.
Speaker 5:
Do I understand you to be arguing that under B it says shell for medical expenses. So if you're the victim, the Court's discretion is limited. It would otherwise be broader. But in this specific context there's medical expenses. You're the victim, you incurred them. You got to make at least partial restitution. If you're not the victim but you suffered some detriment as a result of the crime, maybe the wife had to take time off and lost some wages, something like that then the.
Speaker 5:
Court has much broader discretion and can do it or not do it, as opposed to hear whether the Court has to do it. Is that your argument? In other words, the Court could have said DMS, you're not really a victim, but I think you ought to pay for what you did because they taxpayers were on the hook for that, as opposed to I am required to do this under B. Is that the argument?
Speaker 7:
Correct. That's the statute the trial court specifically invoked, and so it does say it has to be restitution for medical expenses incurred by the victim. So our position is just being that the fact that the statute doesn't say to whom it can go. Our position would be it's not to say we can award restitution for expenses incurred by the victim, given that again, we're not going to see the victim incurred the expenses here, but saying, oh, it can go to anybody else. There are different portions of the statute, of course. Saying it can go to the criminal injuries compensation fund, the general assembly is capable of putting the language in the statute that believes appropriate. It's capable of saying we'll recognize individuals that aren't victims but have paid the cost for victims. We'll recognize a grieve party Going down a slippery slope here, but certainly the fact that a spouse or partner might miss work. I even height-fackled that individual needing counseling. Of course it's pretty far out there. But again, the general assembly could say that if they wanted to, but they've chosen not to do so in section 305.1. That's where we are at this point.
Speaker 7:
There's also an issue as far as came up as far as whether a victim or a grieve party is synonymous. Again, mass can be a victim itself, of course, really the mispronounce of the Brioche case, on which the in which investment occurred from D-Mass itself. So it basically acknowledges that D-Mass can be a victim. D-mass can be in a grieve party In a stabbing case. D-mass cannot be the victim of a stabbing. I submit that in circumstances it's to be determined. As far as whether D-Mass stands as a victim or as a grieve party. It's not a victim.
Speaker 7:
The statute invoked here requires restitution to be paid to the victim. And again, even though we might look in the dictionary and find similar, even identical, definitions for victim versus grieve party, we have to look at what the general assembly did and we have to presume that they use different words and different statutes, so they have different meanings on the same statutory scheme. So, given that we're under a circumstance where the expenses are, if the court finds they were incurred by Mr Hawks, then under a circumstance he is the victim. He's the victim whether he incurred expenses or not, but there's no restitution award to him. The trial court never did that. This statute just simply does not authorize restitution to be ordered to another party If the court has no further questions.
Speaker 7:
I have just a wrap up by this point, saying that if we're to properly interpret jurisprudence regarding statutory interpretation, a pretty straightforward rule will come up saying the harder we try to contoll to assign a meaning to what the general assembly has done, probably the farther to foul territory we're going. And the fact that we're here trying to say that Department of Medical Assistance Services can be a victim of a stabbing, the fact that we're trying to talk about what incur means, even though there might be other definitions for it, and saying that if a party A incurs something that should go to party B, I think that's a pretty clear sign we've contorted pretty far and there's got to be a bounding.
Speaker 1:
Give me a interrupt again. But assume, for the sake of argument, that hypothetically D-MAS is not a victim under any scenario, right, just assume that. And assume that. I think this is right, we've established it. The statute doesn't actually have a provision that says you've got to pay to this person, to the victim, and assume that. Third, and it's the third assumption, the word incurred under AV Automotive includes incurring both the act. But incurring means you paid it, in fact, or you incurred a legal liability that could be enforced, that could force you to pay it.
Speaker 1:
With those, if those three, I'm not asking you to concede any of the three, I promise you. But if those three premises were true, wouldn't the right answer be that they win? I'm trying to make sure I understand this properly. They're not a victim, d-mas is not a victim. Assume, for the sake of argument, that's just a bridge too far linguistically. Two, the statute doesn't say who the payee is. You got to pay the victim, you got to pay the D-MAS, you got to pay the insurance company. It just says it's got to be paid. And three, the word incurred means if you've incurred a legal liability for the expense that is the subject of restitution in addition to you actually paid it out of pocket.
Speaker 7:
Okay, no-transcript expense. Himself he paid everything out of pocket. We're in a very different situation. Assume, of course, the trial court ordered restitution to Justin Hawks and then, of course, if there was some sort of split and Justin Hawks didn't curse, I mean he had to pay a copay or deductible or portion, what have you? Again, there's no evidence of that. Had there been, he's the victim and I would submit that for medical expense incurred by the victim, for an absence in the statute as far as saying who it can go to, so the victim incurred medical expense, you just give the money to anybody. That's a very difficult interpretation. That's going to have to be reigned in at some point.
Speaker 4:
But even if that were true, how does that prejudice the person who was convicted of the crime? What difference does it make to him who he's got to pay the money to if he's got to pay restitution that was incurred by the victim You're on, whatever effect it has on our position is just the statute doesn't authorize the court to make that award.
Speaker 7:
That would be our position at this point.
Speaker 4:
Why would you take that discretion from the trial court? Then, if it doesn't, if it doesn't disadvantage the criminal defendant?
Speaker 7:
You're on our position as trial court doesn't have that discretion. That's what the statute says and if we are to talk about that, the restitution could be ordered to party B for expenses hypothetically incurred by party A. That would be language ads as statute. The General Assembly could have done so if they wanted to. There's several provisions in the restitution statutes about who can receive restitution, who can be awarded to, what kinds of parties can be harmed by crime, including some are victims and some are not. All that language could have been there, but we are contorting, I think, way too hard to add that kind of means of statute. As far as authorizing restitution to somebody other than the victim under any circumstance, our position certainly is the Court of Appeals properly handle the marry as the court to affirm.
Speaker 4:
You have three minutes and nine seconds.
Speaker 2:
Thank you, mr Chief Justice. I want to make a brief point about the statutory structure here. First, what we're dealing with here in 305.1 is the mandatory restitution statute. What it does is require the Court to award restitution in certain circumstances and then grants broad discretion as to how and how much it awards restitution.
Speaker 2:
305 deals with situations in which restitution is awarded as a condition of probation Right, so when the person is going to be released on probation, this is the restitution that they must pay as part of that portion of the sentence. And three deals with restitution that is awarded as part of a suspended sentence. In this particular situation there is a suspended sentence that was imposed on as part of Mr Puckett's sentence, but that's not necessarily true in every case. We could have a case in which the Court, as this one did, wants to award restitution as part of the sentence the main sentence imposed on Mr Puckett and has a medical expense, and wants to do so here. Here what the General Assembly did my friend on the other side is correct that the General Assembly could have added whatever qualifying language it pleased what it was equally able to do, and what it did here was write a statute that broadly accomplished the remedial goals of restitution by writing a statute that included both an expansive definition of victim and permitted an expansive definition of the term incurred.
Speaker 3:
If this Court has no further questions, the Commonwealth asks the proceeding has been a production of Ben Glass Law, a Fairfax, virginia based personal injury and long term disability law firm. For a free evaluation of your claim, visit us at BenGlassLawcom or call us at 703-591-9829.