What if the car parked for months in your neighborhood could spark a riveting legal battle? Well, brace yourself as we journey through the intricate case of Bryant McCants versus CDMPB Enterprises LLC in our latest podcast episode. We dissect the multifaceted arguments surrounding the controversial conversion of an abandoned Mustang vehicle, unmasking potential missteps in the court of appeals' analysis. From the intricate layers of the Mako franchisee company's ownership to the evidence that underpinned the jury's verdict, we leave no stone unturned.
Are you ready to question everything you know about abandoned vehicles and liability? Buckle up, because in the second half, we ignite an intriguing conversation on how agency law and jury instructions shape the determination of liability, especially when a vehicle is claimed to be abandoned. We shine a spotlight on the defendant's actions versus the company’s role, putting the concept of possession under the microscope. We round off with a fiery debate about the interpretation of the abandoned vehicle statute. Is it too aggressive? Does consent need to be communicated? Prepare to have your perspective broadened and your legal curiosity piqued. Tune in, and let's navigate these captivating legal mazes together!
This podcast is brought to you by Virginia Injury and Disability law firm, Ben Glass Law.
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Your life has been disrupted. You have good doctors and they support you. Your personal injury or long-term disability claim seems like a slam dunk. But there’s a problem: The insurance company doesn’t believe you. “You can’t be hurt that bad! Our medical experts say you’re fine.”
You need a trusted advocate who can uncover all the facts, tell your story to the skeptical insurance company, and get you the money you deserve. You don’t have to do this alone. Contact our Virginia personal injury and long-term disability lawyers today for a free consultation or denial letter review.
What if the car parked for months in your neighborhood could spark a riveting legal battle? Well, brace yourself as we journey through the intricate case of Bryant McCants versus CDMPB Enterprises LLC in our latest podcast episode. We dissect the multifaceted arguments surrounding the controversial conversion of an abandoned Mustang vehicle, unmasking potential missteps in the court of appeals' analysis. From the intricate layers of the Mako franchisee company's ownership to the evidence that underpinned the jury's verdict, we leave no stone unturned.
Are you ready to question everything you know about abandoned vehicles and liability? Buckle up, because in the second half, we ignite an intriguing conversation on how agency law and jury instructions shape the determination of liability, especially when a vehicle is claimed to be abandoned. We shine a spotlight on the defendant's actions versus the company’s role, putting the concept of possession under the microscope. We round off with a fiery debate about the interpretation of the abandoned vehicle statute. Is it too aggressive? Does consent need to be communicated? Prepare to have your perspective broadened and your legal curiosity piqued. Tune in, and let's navigate these captivating legal mazes together!
This podcast is brought to you by Virginia Injury and Disability law firm, Ben Glass Law.
Real legal help for real people
Your life has been disrupted. You have good doctors and they support you. Your personal injury or long-term disability claim seems like a slam dunk. But there’s a problem: The insurance company doesn’t believe you. “You can’t be hurt that bad! Our medical experts say you’re fine.”
You need a trusted advocate who can uncover all the facts, tell your story to the skeptical insurance company, and get you the money you deserve. You don’t have to do this alone. Contact our Virginia personal injury and long-term disability lawyers today for a free consultation or denial letter review.
And some of the rhetoric used by the Court of Appeals in its order, I think, reflects a little bit of a different analysis. They're almost making it look like did the defendants have enough evidence, and that, respectfully, again, is not the appropriate standard. Is there sufficient evidence to support the plaintiff's verdict and the verdict of the jury? And I think, with respect, that's almost wholly ground. There should be clear and obvious reasons why that shouldn't be overturned, and I think in this case the best they can point to is that there would be conflicts in the evidence with regards to the 48 hours, and I think there's a tremendous amount of information again.
Speaker 2:
Welcome to the Supreme Court of Virginia podcast. This podcast is brought to you by Ben Glass Law, a personal injury and long-term disability law firm with headquarters in Fairfax, Virginia. Listening to oral arguments is one of the best ways to both learn and stay abreast of the substantive and procedural aspects of practicing law in Virginia. By putting these public domain recordings into the form of a podcast, Ben Glass Law has made it easy for the public to access these recordings. All commentary that is not part of the actual court proceedings is that of the show's sponsor.
Speaker 3:
Bryant McCants versus CDMPB Enterprises LLC, doing business as Mako at all. Dirk McLanahan and Elizabeth Melander, appellants Council. Patrick Keane, appellants Council.
Speaker 1:
Good morning your honors. May it please the court. My name is Dirk McLanahan. I'm from the law firm McLanahan Powers.
Speaker 1:
I'm here on Bryant McCants. I had the honor and pleasure of being the trial counsel in this case in the Richmond Circuit Court. That case resulted in a jury verdict in the finding of Mr McCants on the count of conversion that case was. Then a motion was filed. After that jury verdict, after a three day jury trial In that jury verdict the or after that motion I apologize the defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court denied that motion. Following that was an appeal to the court of appeals. During the court of appeals the court of appeals reversed the conversion count and we have then subsequently appealed that action to this honorable court.
Speaker 1:
The case of this matter stems from a conversion or the alleged conversion of a Mustang motor vehicle using the abandoned vehicle statute. The abandoned vehicle statute is probably not widely known and not widely talked about amongst the cases, but the heart of the issue that we are addressing and the subject of the appeal and where we believe we respectfully that the court of appeals erred in its analysis, is related to the application of the abandoned vehicle process as it relates to conversion. So the court of appeals in the initial argument was that the use of this statute improperly was a wrongful dominion and exercise dominion. So the question that ultimately was asked and assessed by the court of appeals and that we've asked this court to look at here, based on the evidence from the trial record, is what evidence is there that the abandoned vehicle process was not properly followed?
Speaker 4:
Can I interrupt you with a couple of clarification questions. Yes, your Honor, the vehicle was left at the Mako repair shop that Butler worked at right. Yes, your Honor, I take it he was a shareholder.
Speaker 1:
He wasn't owner. Yes, your Honor.
Speaker 4:
Owner of the Mako franchisee company. That is correct CDMPB Enterprises. Your Honor, didn't Mako the franchisee company, the entity that contracted with your client, and the entity, I presume, that owned the facility and owned the property? Wasn't that the party that had possession, as opposed to simply a shareholder in the company, even a sole shareholder? Yes, your Honor Throws the whole case off the ledge for the other side. And even before you get to the use of the abandoned vehicle statute, does that matter preserved for us? On appeal.
Speaker 1:
I believe it is. Yes, your Honor, I believe that was one of the primary arguments that had been made was the fact that the actions that took place, all of the contracting, that there was a significant distinction between CDMPB and the actions of Mr Hansen Butler. I believe that is why, when we saw the court of appeals, we saw a slight attempt at a pivot from some of the arguments by saying the jury instruction 16 attempts to somehow link them together in terms of actions of one as actions of all.
Speaker 5:
But doesn't it basically say that for any action he took he was acting as an agent of Mako? It's a relatively standard vicarious liability instruction, but isn't that what jury instruction 16 that was given and not objected to says?
Speaker 1:
Respectfully. I do not believe so, your Honor, I think the conclusion as lawyers it may be that an instruction if it had said vicarious liability, or if it had said the actions of Mako are the actions of Mr Butler or they stand in the same shoes. But it doesn't say that. It says if you find liability against Hansen Butler, then you find liability against Mako, and I think that's a significant distinction. And so we could have framed it in the language that the jury interpreted and then made its ruling upon, could have said if Hansen Butler takes an action, it is as though Mako takes an action. And I think that's the distinction, and I know it's a subtle one and I don't mean to be insincere or pejorative on the analysis, but I think it's a significant one. It's not that subtle, it's basic agency law.
Speaker 4:
Butler is an agent of his Mako company, but the Mako company is not an agent of Butler and the contract was not with Butler. The contract was with Mako. So Mako was the only entity, the only person under the statute who could even bring the abandoned vehicles provision.
Speaker 4:
Someone parked a car down in the courthouse and I walked down there and I said you need to get your car out of here. I couldn't file the action. The court would have to file the action because it's in the possession of the court, not me or any of the so-called equity owners of this operation. Why would it be any different for a corporate entity?
Speaker 1:
I do not think it is at all. I think the case law as well further supports that. Virginia has long identified a distinction that an entity is entirely separate from the individual.
Speaker 4:
One last question, and then I'll let you get back to your free of thought. Was there anything in the contractual relationship, in the order itself, the written order, or any invoicing or anything that did provide a possible basis for Butler to claim is that he was the possessor, not Mako the franchisee?
Speaker 1:
I do not believe so. In fact I would say affirmatively the opposite. Your Honor, I believe that the language on the orders, to my recollection, I don't even know that they say Hanson Butler's name. I don't even know that that they identify him as a manager. I don't think it's not required to sign them. He's not required to identify in any way. It doesn't refer to any sort of it's pretty bare bones. There's not a terms and conditions attachment to it. So what is what you get on the face plate of it? And it doesn't indicate any authority or power. That could even be implied that the manager could then somehow self assume a vehicle for some reason and certainly, mr McCants, that would be a dubious provision for him to want to agree to that. The manager could somehow uniformly Go ahead and cycle back to your 48 hour point.
Speaker 4:
Okay, yes, your honor.
Speaker 1:
So, with regards looking first at the 48 hour issue or looking at it second, now, the critical issue in this case and I say this respectfully, I think it's clear from the record, but I think it was clear from the trial is that Mr Butler. It is not a far stretch to believe that this jury could have concluded that Mr Butler's objective statements are dubious. His credibility was dubious. He had numerous issues in the record that were inconsistent with the objective, factual evidence in the record. And so then we look to the only evidence in this record that the defendants contend exists that they didn't abandon the vehicle. Is Mr Butler saying, oh yes, 48 hours before I abandoned it? There's no text messages, there's no emails.
Speaker 1:
In fact, contrary to that, there's evidence that only days before, a week before Mr Harrison goes and I know these names sometimes are confusing if you're not super familiar and Mr Harrison was a friend of Mr McCants, he owns a car dealership. He went to the dealership to see Mr Butler. Mr Butler identifies that they came. They have a disagreement factually about what happened during that meeting but ultimately conclude hey, I'll make some of these repairs Thereafter. Mr Harrison leads and essentially, according to the record, if you believe, mr Butler believed that meeting happened October. The abandoned vehicle paperwork was initiated in October 17th, in a fairly short period of time. Mr Butler concluded that, or alleges that, he effectuated the abandoned vehicle paperwork. I think if we look at the record facts in this case, there's tremendous information that they were doing repairs and I don't think it is a stretch for a jury. To conclude, I don't believe Mr Butler followed a complex statutory scheme. I think Mr Butler simply just elected one day.
Speaker 5:
Classic conflict in the evidence. This is the jury's to resolve.
Speaker 1:
Yes, your honor. And as a result of that, on a jury verdict. Overturning a jury verdict by the Court of Appeals with respect, I think was an error because there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the verdict. There was no storage fees charged, even though the contract had storage fees. I asked Mr Butler, do you routinely charge storage fees or you just not charge them? He says no, we routinely charge them. There's no dispute that Mr McCants didn't have any fees or anything owed to him or from him In that short period of time and in order to charge storage fees it had to be on the lot for seven days under the contract before the fees would start.
Speaker 1:
For all of those reasons I don't think there's any legitimate basis that they have to distinguish that there was unequivocally no way that we could prove it. They hadn't had consent for 48 hours. I think that's a factual conflict. I will say I don't have a tremendous amount to add to the abandoned vehicle paperwork side of it. Others on the second component, with regards to whether or not they were in possession and control, because we've discussed that, but again just to reiterate, I think CDMPV is an absolutely separate legal entity. It's registered separately. There's no doubt about that. It's not a sole proprietorship of Mr Butler for any reason.
Speaker 2:
This podcast is brought to you by Ben Glass Law, a statewide leader in the personal injury field. We help the injured and disabled make great decisions about their legal situations. Visit our website at benglaslawcom or call us at 703-591-9829 for more information and a free evaluation of your and that was never established and it's certainly not on the record.
Speaker 1:
So I think for purposes of the case, we've established it If I met four minutes left, if I may reserve two minutes for rebuttal, and I would just say this is an unusual case and it's gone on for quite some time. I've had the pleasure and honor to litigate this case with Mr Patrick Keane, with a number of young lawyers in this case, and I don't think there's any better time to praise an opposing counsel than now before the highest court in the land of Virginia and so Mr Keane has been an absolutely first class litigator and civil opposing counsel in this case. Thank you.
Speaker 6:
Thank you, good morning. May it please the court, your honor. I think this is essentially. Well, it's not essentially. This is a. My name is Patrick Keane, I represent CD and PB Enterprises and Mr Hanson Butler. I will try not to, but I'll occasionally lapse into referring to the corporate entity as Mako. It's a Mako franchise.
Speaker 4:
CD and PB is the entity that's the franchisee and they own the property on which the vehicle was positioned and situated. Correct your Honor. And there's no contractual relationship between Butler and McCants other than Butler acting as an agent, not vice versa, of the entity that was contracting with the customer, correct your Honor. So how, on the statute, is Mr Butler a possessor? The CD and PB is the possessor. Even before you get to the 48 hour issue.
Speaker 6:
Your Honor, I respectfully disagree with you on that. I think if you look at the language that the statute uses, it refers to any person in possession.
Speaker 4:
Yeah, a person under our law is obviously a corporate entity as well as an individual. But would you say that the Walmart manager is possessing all the vehicles in the Walmart parking lot? You'd say the Walmart's possessing it. They contract, they have the relationship with the customer, not the Walmart manager. So that struck me at the very beginning of the case. I thought it seemed to went off the rails on that very point.
Speaker 6:
Your Honor to that point. The statute says any person in possession and I think the AVP statute, the abandoned vehicle process statute, deals with disposing of an abandoned vehicle. It doesn't deal with removing the abandoned vehicle Right. Anyone who's been to an apartment complex in part two long knows you might get yourself towed. You don't need the abandoned vehicle process to get towed. If you're there too long you're going to get towed. Now the person who towed your vehicle on behalf of the apartment owner they are now any person in possession. They could implement the abandoned vehicle process.
Speaker 4:
I agree, but the agent can represent the principal in court, but the principal's got to be in court.
Speaker 6:
I agree, your Honor, but by the same token, the corporation acts through its agents.
Speaker 4:
That's inverting agency law. It's upside down. Here we're talking about who is the possessor. It's not the agent, it is the principal. The agent can act on behalf of the principal, so Butler could have obviously filed the action on behalf of the actual possessor.
Speaker 6:
I understand your point, your Honor, and Mr Butler was an owner of CDMPB Enterprises and, at the end of the day, he is the owner of that property.
Speaker 4:
That technically doesn't mean much, because, unless you want to use alter ego or reverse piercing the corporate veil, let me give you the example that worries me before I take up all your time on this. Suppose there are creditors of the franchisee Under the abandoned vehicle statute, I would think and I'm looking to correct me if you disagree that the abandoned vehicle would come back to the entity that had the contractual possessory interest, which is the franchisee, the Mako franchisee, cdmpb. Right, cdmpb could very well have liens on their assets, could have creditors that have security interests or security agreements, and so it didn't go to the franchisee, it went to Butler. Am I right? That was the end of the proceeding, the abandoned vehicle proceeding. It went to Butler and Butler sold it.
Speaker 6:
After Mr McCann's lost title to the company. That's correct.
Speaker 4:
Why would it go to Butler? All of the creditors of the franchisee didn't even have the asset even go through the franchisee. It went directly to the stockholder.
Speaker 6:
I agree, your Honor, but I think the statute does not to that point and I appreciate that I've covered this briefly before. If the statute wanted to limit initiation of the abandoned vehicle process to the owner of the property, it could have done so. The term owner is utilized in section I apologize 46.2-1200, 2, sub 2.
Speaker 4:
So the Walmart manager owns. The Walmart manager can bring an action for every abandoned vehicle in the Walmart parking lot because the manager is sitting in the office somewhere, is possessing the vehicle your Honor to that point.
Speaker 6:
I think Walmart wouldn't have any by the statute. Walmart wouldn't have any greater claim to an abandoned vehicle on the property.
Speaker 4:
Except it's on their property, correct, and the contract with the customer is with Walmart, not with the Walmart manager.
Speaker 6:
I understand your Honor's point, but there's no clear reason, then why the statute would utilize the person in possession language as opposed to the language owner of the property, as used in the definition of an abandoned vehicle. How?
Speaker 5:
does the act work if it is left? If the property is abandoned on a public street in front of my house but not my property, is that property? Is that car subject to the abandoned vehicle act?
Speaker 6:
I believe it is, but not by any person. I believe that, under the act, municipality has the right to invoke the abandoned vehicle process.
Speaker 5:
Doesn't that support, justice Kelsey, that it's on whose property it's on?
Speaker 6:
For purposes of consent and whether it's abandoned. Absolutely correct and to your owner's point, if the car is parked in front of your house and that's public roadway, it doesn't qualify as an abandoned vehicle. As far as your concern because it's not on your property and that's my larger point is that the statute could have very easily said that it's an abandoned vehicle if it's there for 48 hours without the consent of the owner. And the owner of the property can.
Speaker 4:
I don't have a problem with that. With respect to my questions, If the contract was with Mr Butler, not with Mako, his company, and he possessed it under the, he had a possessory interest in the Mustang to fix it by virtue of the owner of the Mustang giving contractual rights to possess it. Didn't matter if it's on the Walmart parking lot, he can bring the action because he's the possessor. But I think it's better to shift to your next point, the 48 hours point. According to the Court of Appeals, it was evident that Mako had withdrawn consent, which is interesting, by the time of Butler's final text. Wasn't that a factual question for the jury?
Speaker 6:
I don't believe it was your honor, because there was absolutely no evidence presented as to consent over the last 48 hours, other than the testimony that came from Mr Butler himself on behalf of.
Speaker 4:
Doesn't there have to be evidence of withdrawal of consent? Consent will obviously existed previously.
Speaker 6:
Your honor, and the statute actually addresses that too as part of the definition of abandoned vehicle. It's irrelevant whether or not consent existed originally when a vehicle was brought onto private property. Just the statute says if for 48 hours prior to the point consent does not exist, then the vehicle is deemed abandoned.
Speaker 5:
If the jury did not believe Mr Butler's statement that he said there is no consent, we've withdrawn consent for it to be here. Is there any other evidence that compels the jury to find that there was no consent? Because it seemed to me that people were disagreeing over whether there was consent or not, which is a classic jury question.
Speaker 6:
Yes, your honor, there is. There was evidence in the record the final text message that Mr Butler sent to Mr McCant, if I are a couple of different ways to interpret that. Okay, respectfully your honor, I disagree because I think he was pretty clearly saying come get this off the lot. We think he clearly said that what do I have to do to get you to come get this car?
Speaker 7:
How much more do I have to repair before you come and get this car?
Speaker 1:
How much more for discount do I need to give you before you come and get this car?
Speaker 6:
Fair point, your honors, but there was absolutely no contrary evidence. The jury, I think, would be speculating at that point.
Speaker 5:
But it's your burden correct To establish that you had your defense to the conversion claim is it was a by vehicle, so don't you have to establish that it was your vehicle, Correct?
Speaker 6:
and the only evidence as to whether or not the consent existed for that 48 hours was Mr Butler's testimony as the owner and operator of the MAKO in question.
Speaker 4:
So the withdrawal of consent has to be communicated right.
Speaker 6:
I disagree, your honor. If you look at the statute again, the statute does not deal with, does not have any requirement that consent be transmitted or notified, and I think that's a larger important point here. To use the example I gave earlier of the tow truck driver, if Walmart finds an abandoned vehicle on its property and that happens some people once their car gives up the ghost well, that's not my issue anymore and they leave it wherever they find it. If Walmart were to have that vehicle towed off the property to some tow truck yard somewhere, my reading of the statute is that tow truck driver would have every right to institute the abandoned vehicle process.
Speaker 4:
There's no pre-existing consent by the end. But if someone drops a car off with a repair shop and there's obviously consent, the consent is picks my car and the car shop two, three days later says I'm gonna go to Maui for the next month and I want this guy to take his car away. And he doesn't say anything to the customer and he runs off to Maui. He can have someone follow the suit within 48 hours.
Speaker 6:
To initiate the process, your Honor, yes, does that make any sense at all? It's an aggressive statute, I certainly agree, but the statute does not require that consent be communicated, it doesn't require any sort of written notice, and I think part of the reason for that is what I said. Vehicles get left on private property and there's no way of knowing who the owner is.
Speaker 7:
Assuming your interpretation of the statute is correct, that consent does not have to be communicated. There was a course of dealing between these parties that is evident in this record that someone would come see if the repairs were satisfactory. If they were not, they would leave and your client was to make the repairs. Someone would come check the repairs and this went on for a while. Again, getting back to the question many of my colleagues have asked isn't it a jury question as to whether consent had been withdrawn? I think it is a jury question and there was evidence in the record from which the jury could find that it had not been withdrawn.
Speaker 6:
I agree that it was a jury question as to whether or not consent had been withdrawn. I do not believe there's any evidence suggesting that it had been withdrawn in the 48 hours prior to the initiation process that consent existed.
Speaker 5:
And I just want to make sure I understand what you contend. The statute means I have a friend who's going on a tour around the world and says you live close to the airport. Can I drop my car off at your house? I say sure. I know he's going to be gone for 30 days. Two days into it I decided in my own mind I no longer consent to the car being here. I don't have to tell him, I can wait 48 hours and initiate the process.
Speaker 6:
That's my reading of the statute. I'm not saying it's a kind and gentle statute, but it's the whole point of it is that it's notable.
Speaker 4:
The goal is you take the vehicle, you do constructive notice and your buddies in Europe say you can get the notice and the judge gives you the vehicle. That can't possibly be what they did. It sounds like what you're saying is you don't need to communicate the lack of consent if you've not given consent. But if you give consent, you should communicate the withdrawal of the existing indeterminately ending consent.
Speaker 6:
I think I understand and the example that was provided by the court. I haven't thought about that in great detail, but it sounds like fraud in that situation.
Speaker 5:
It sounds like it removed it from the version. It's a crazy hypothetical so I'll make it crazy. I did not have that intention. When I got him to leave the car there, it took two days. I decided I was sick of it being there.
Speaker 6:
If the question of the court is does the statute need some work by the legislature? I think it does. I think 48 hours is fairly aggressive.
Speaker 5:
I appreciate you didn't write it.
Speaker 7:
In the meantime, let's invite people to park their cars on our land so we can improve our fleet.
Speaker 6:
I'm not sure the car is better, I suppose Under that. There you're on. My concern is that by applying the statute to mean that only the owner can initiate the abandoned vehicle process, then that would effectively eliminate the statute as it relates to, like I said, a sole proprietor.
Speaker 4:
I wasn't implying. That was my question. So make it clear it's the possessor, but Butler was not the possessor. The company that contracted and acquired the possessory interest was the franchisee, MAKA, which is this company, but it's a separate legal entity.
Speaker 6:
I guess I don't read the statute as implying that there is a legally cognizable legal right to the vehicle when it says any person in possession.
Speaker 4:
Possession is a common law concept. Possession actually has a definition. It's a legal right to temporarily hold on to it. The contract that gave the legal right to temporarily hold on to the property was not with Butler, so he couldn't have taken the thing and driven it down to the beach for three or four days. He would have been converting it then because MAKA, his company, is the company that had the possessory interest.
Speaker 6:
Your Honor, if I may. I'm about to run out of time, but I'd like to respond. Yes, please. Thank you, Possession is a legal concept. I don't believe there's any necessary implication that it needs to have some legal right associated to it. People are charged with possession of stolen goods. Frequently they're in possession of it. It doesn't mean they're legally entitled to possess those goods. Thank you, your Honor.
Speaker 4:
Thank you, Council you have three minutes and 38 seconds.
Speaker 1:
Thank you, your Honors, and I don't believe I'll need that time unless your Honors have any further questions with me.
Speaker 4:
Can I ask you this before you get started, though? If a thief stole a vehicle off the street, just stole it and possessed it, they'd be able to go into court and file constructive service of process on the owner, the victim of the theft, and say a withdrew consent for me to keep it 48 hours, because that's seemingly the anomaly that the interpretation I just heard ends up saying but maybe I'm misunderstanding it you walk me through it from your perspective.
Speaker 1:
No, your Honor, I agree.
Speaker 1:
In fact, the notation I have is the word wrongful, which is there's some sort of reading that is trying to be interpreted where it says it doesn't say wrongful rightful possession and therefore it can also include a wrongful possession.
Speaker 1:
I think that would be an incredibly strained reading of the language. I think, taken plainly for what it's intending to do, you couldn't take my neighbor's car that's sitting in their driveway, break into it, pull it into my driveway and then initiate the abandoned vehicle paperwork. I don't believe that is at all what that statute permits allows or the language permits, and I think trying to read into it that it doesn't use the word wrongful or non-wrongfully taken doesn't, to me, change the possession and analysis in any way, and I think it would be in part, of least narrow and strained reading to get there. In terms of there was. As the trial attorney, it always is painful for me to hear the assertion that there isn't evidence, so I just want to make sure that I address that a little bit. I think there was evidence that they had consent in there and both testimonial and the actual contract.
Speaker 1:
in this case there was a contract. That contract said if this is staying beyond its appropriate amount of time, after seven days we can charge a storage fee, which would indicate that the vehicle was now somehow staying beyond its period. None of that happened in this case. None of that was ever done. In fact, it was never identified that the work that was agreed to be fixed was ever completed. So I actually think the record is fairly well rounded in the sense that there was plenty of evidence that it was not abandoned up until the date that Mr Butler initiated the paperwork without informing anyone. Your Honors, I don't want to take up any more of your time. I'm happy to answer any other questions, but I don't have anything further to add. All right, thank you very much, council. Thank you, your Honors. Please call the next case.
Speaker 8:
Hey, this is Ben Glass, just budding in here. If you like this podcast, I've got two others you might like listening to. The first are the oral argument recordings of the Court of Appeals of Virginia podcast. The second, if you're an attorney, and particularly if you're a law firm owner, go over and listen to the Renegade Lawyer podcast. We talk about living life to the fullest using the vehicle of a law firm to get there. Check us out and have a great day.
Speaker 2:
The proceeding has been a production of Ben Glass Law, a Fairfax, virginia based personal injury and long term disability law firm. For a free evaluation of your claim, visit us at benglaslawcom or call us at 703-591-9829.